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INTRODUCTION
Sixteen years ago, Ninth Circuit Judge and former Berkeley professor William Fletcher wrote “we have in the United
States an essentially chaotic system in which a multitude of
different choice of law systems are employed by different
1
states.” Empirically, his observation remains true. A recent
survey identifies no fewer than seven distinct choice-of-law
2
methodologies presently used by the states. Further complicating matters, fifteen states use more than one methodology, de1. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Fed. Express Corp., 189 F.3d 914, 927 (9th Cir.
1999) (Fletcher, J., concurring). For a similar observation made seventy-five
years earlier, see infra note 204; see also Walter Wheeler Cook, The Powers of
Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421, 422, 432–
33 (1919) (speaking of choice-of-law as “legal anarchy” that yields “chaos and
confusion, not to say injustice”).
2. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in
2012: Twenty-Sixth Annual Survey, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 217, 279 (2013).
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ploying one for tort and another for contract questions. Recent
empirical studies confirm that different choice-of-law method4
ologies produce different outcomes.
But while the fact of a “multitude of different choice of law
systems” is undeniable, its normativity requires careful consideration. After all, states also differ in their tort, contract, and
family law, yet we do not typically bemoan as ‘chaotic’ those interstate differences. Quite to the contrary: we praise our federalism for allowing states to adopt divergent laws that best re5
flect their citizens’ distinctive values. Then why are different
tort and family laws across states acceptable, but not choice-oflaw?
Answering this question is not so easy—indeed, Supreme
Court precedent suggests that cross-state variations in choiceof-law are just fine. The 1941 case of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec6
tric Manufacturing Co. identified choice-of-law as state law,
and ruled that federal courts sitting in diversity must use the
conflicts rules applied by the state in which the federal court is
7
located. Klaxon recognized this could create a “lack of uniformity . . . between federal courts in different states” since
8
states utilize different choice-of-law rules. But any such
nonuniformity, explained the Court, “is attributable to our federal system, which leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local policies di9
verging from those of its neighbors.” In other words, choice-oflaw is no different from family law in respect of differences
across states.
This Article argues that today’s disorder in choice-of-law is
traceable to a largely overlooked conceptual mistake in Klax-

3. Id.
4. See Stuart E. Thiel, Choice of Law and the Home-Court Advantage:
Evidence, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 291, 310–13 (2000); see also Christopher A.
Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 719, 750, 771 (2009) (concluding that “choice-of-law doctrine does affect
decisions” of federal courts in a dataset of international tort cases, and
summarizing three different earlier studies by different investigators as
having “found significant differences between the[] outcomes” between the
First Restatement and modern methods in domestic choice-of-law cases).
5. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political
Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 886–91 (2002).
6. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
7. Id. at 496–97.
8. Id. at 496.
9. Id.
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on —the assumption that choice-of-law is state law—and that
Klaxon must be overruled. Choice-of-law was not viewed as
state law for most of our country’s history, but long was conceptualized as a subset of the “general commercial law” of private
11
international law, which was neither state nor federal. Crossstate uniformity was one of the general law’s signal characteristics, and expectations of uniformity extended to choice-of-law.
After Erie declared “[t]here is no federal general common
12
law,” what had been understood to be general law had to be
parceled out into one of the categories of law Erie recognized as
13
legitimate. There were two main options—state and federal—
and Klaxon put choice-of-law into the box of state law.
This Article provides four arguments as to why choice-oflaw is best understood to be federal law, not state law. The first
argument is an amalgam of history and functional analysis: in
a post-Erie world in which all law must be attributed to a sovereign, choice-of-law must be federal because only federal law
can satisfy what I call choice-of-law’s ”Single System Requirement.“ To explain, while choice-of-law presupposes variations
across states in the substantive law to which it applies, choiceof-law cannot effectively serve its managerial function of predictably determining which state’s law applies if choice-of-law
itself varies across states. This gives rise to the Single System
Requirement: all polities whose differences in substantive law
give rise to the need for choice-of-law must use the same choiceof-law rules. While general law satisfied the Single System Requirement before Erie, only federal law can fulfill the Single
System Requirement after Erie.
The Article also advances three conceptual arguments for
the conclusion that choice-of-law is inherently federal. First, at
its core, choice-of-law sorts out conflicts between states’ overlapping regulatory powers, a federal role by its very nature. Second, choice-of-law plays a substantial role in determining the
character of our federal union; choice-of-law plays a crucial role
in determining to what extent states can, as a practical matter,
have divergent substantive laws in fields that federal constitu-

10. For other scholars who have considered the possibility that choice-oflaw is federal, see infra notes 14–19.
11. See infra Part I.A.2.
12. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
13. This is not to suggest that general law altogether disappeared after
Erie. See generally Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 503, 505 (2006) (describing modern general law).
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tional and statutory law does not demand national uniformity.
Third, choice-of-law plays a crucial role in maintaining the
health of our interstate system. State law is unsuited to discharging these three tasks, whereas federal law is the most
functionally appropriate and democratically legitimate resource
for accomplishing them.
In addition to these four arguments, the Article also makes
the positive doctrinal case for its claim that choice-of-law is
federal law. The Full Faith and Credit Clause’s “effects clause”
grants Congress the power to enact choice-of-law rules for state
courts, and the Diversity Clause (in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause) authorizes Congress to create
choice-of-law rules for federal courts.
Because choice-of-law must be federal law, Klaxon’s dramatic break with the past—its holding that choice-of-law is
state law that can vary across states—must be overruled. To be
more precise, the Article argues that a post-Klaxon amendment
to the Full Faith and Credit Act is best understood as having
partially overturned Klaxon, and as currently providing a statutory basis for the development by state courts (and possibly
federal courts too) of a single body of federal choice-of-law that
is applicable in all courts. But Klaxon unquestionably impairs
the effectiveness of a second federal statute, the Rules of Decision Act, which provides clearer authorization than the Full
Faith and Credit Act for federal courts to create a body of
choice-of-law—yet another reason Klaxon should be overruled.
As this Article explains, the Full Faith and Credit Act and
the Rules of Decision Act are best understood as imposing obligations consistent with the Single System Requirement: the
two statutes require that the same federal choice-of-law rules
be operative in state and federal courts. The statutes do not detail what those choice-of-law rules would be, but—like the antitrust laws—delegate courts the authority to flesh out choice-oflaw rules on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, the understanding
that choice-of-law is federal provides considerable guidance in
formulating choice-of-law rules.
An important implication of this Article’s argument is that
federal courts are not alone in being responsible for developing
the federal common law of choice-of-law. Rather, they have two
partners: state courts and Congress. State courts have the
power—indeed, a constitutional duty under the Supremacy
Clause—to apply, and where necessary to develop, federal
choice-of-law. This is so because when state courts hear inter-
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state disputes requiring them to determine which state’s law
applies, they necessarily must rely upon—and in the process
develop on a case-by-case basis—the federal Full Faith and
Credit Act. And because Congress has ultimate authority over
choice-of-law, it can always legislatively revise the choice-of-law
rules that the courts have generated—even those of the Supreme Court.
Significantly, both federal and state courts would be developing and applying the same body of law; there is one federal
choice-of-law, and it is operative in both federal and state
courts across the entire country. The large number of courts involved in developing choice-of-law is a boon insofar as it holds
out the prospect of a rapid airing of doctrinal alternatives. Entropic dangers would be checked by the federal appellate system that would review the choice-of-law holdings of both state
and federal courts, and by Congress, which has the power to
codify or modify courts’ choice-of-law doctrines.
While this Article argues that choice-of-law doctrine went
seriously amiss seventy-three years ago in Klaxon, the Article
is neither a wholesale rejection of modern choice-of-law doctrine nor a call for returning to the “general law.” The Article
identifies genuine insights of both the traditional and modern
choice-of-law approaches. But the Article also locates traditional and modern understandings that must be discarded, as it
provides a new conceptual scaffolding for the development of a
uniform body of federal choice-of-law.
This Article follows in the path of a small but important
body of scholarship that has contemplated the federalization of
choice-of-law. Donald Trautman and Harold Horowitz argued
in short articles in the 1960s and 1970s that choice-of-law
14
should be treated as federal common law, as did Doug Laycock
15
in an important article twenty years ago. In the 1990s, Michael Gottesman called upon Congress to enact a federal
14. See Harold W. Horowitz, Toward a Federal Common Law of Choice of
Law, 14 UCLA L. REV. 1191 (1967); Donald T. Trautman, The Relation
Between American Choice of Law and Federal Common Law, 41 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (1977); see also Donald T. Trautman, Toward
Federalizing Choice of Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1715, 1718 (1992) [hereinafter
Trautman, Toward Federalizing].
15. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States:
The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249,
332–33 (1992). In addition to the critiques I provide here, see infra notes 263–
65, other important parts of Professor Laycock’s constitutional argument have
been subject to substantial criticism. See Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and
Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 1201, 1217–21 (2009).
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16

choice-of-law statute, though decades earlier William Baxter
had pointed to one federal statute, and Elliott Cheatham to another, that, each argued, federalized choice-of-law to some ex17
18
tent. Like Henry Hart sixty years ago, recent articles by Allan Erbsen and Kermit Roosevelt understand choice-of-law
rules in federal courts sitting in diversity to be federal law, but
19
treat choice-of-law rules in state courts as state law.
This Article builds upon much, though also rejects some, of
these scholars’ arguments and conclusions. This Article’s
aforementioned four arguments fortify the sometimes
conclusory assertions found in the abovementioned scholarship
20
that choice-of-law is federal. But the Article refutes the sug16. See Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for
Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 23 (1991).
17. See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16
STAN. L. REV. 1, 40–41 (1963) (arguing that the Rules of Decision Act
authorizes federal courts sitting in diversity to create federal choice-of-law
rules); Elliott E. Cheatham, A Federal Nation and Conflict of Laws, 22 ROCKY
MOUNTAIN L. REV. 109, 114 (1950) [hereinafter Cheatham, A Federal Nation]
(suggesting that the 1948 amendments to the Full Faith and Credit Act might
determine the choice-of-law rules applicable in state courts); Elliott E.
Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REV. 581, 585–87
(1951) [hereinafter Cheatham, Federal Control]. Laycock made a fleeting
reference as well. See Laycock, supra note 15, at 332.
18. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law,
54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 513–14 (1954) (concluding that although state law
appropriately governs choice-of-law in litigation among “citizens of the same
state [in] the courts of their own state . . . [i]t does not follow that these
questions should be similarly disposed of when they arise between citizens of
different states,” and asking “[w]hy is it an offense to the ideals of federalism
for federal courts to administer, between citizens of different states, a juster
justice than state courts . . . ?”).
19. See Allan Erbsen, Erie’s Four Functions: Reframing Choice of Law in
Federal Courts, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 641–43 (2013) (“[I]t does not
necessarily follow that federal courts should create a uniquely federal choice of
law rule rather than adopting choice of law rules from state governments.”);
Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon
to CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 22 n.109 (2012) (suggesting
the federal choice-of-law rule might “incorporat[e] the preexisting state rule”).
In an interesting article, William Baude argues that federal choice-of-law
doctrine should be applicable when federal substantive statutes reference
state law. See William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal
Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (2012). Baude’s argument does not address the
choice-of-law that is operative in state courts, or in federal courts sitting in
diversity.
20. To restate them: (1) the Single System Requirement (that all polities
whose differences in substantive law occasion the need for choice-of-law utilize
the same choice-of-law rules), shows that choice-of-law pre-Klaxon was
conceptualized in a way that satisfied the Single System Requirement, and
explains why only federal law can satisfy it in a post-Erie world; and (2)

ROSEN_5fmt

2015]

2/3/2015 10:09 AM

CHOICE-OF-LAW

1025

gestion that there is a federal choice-of-law for federal courts
21
but a state law of choice-of-law for state courts; the assump22
tion that choice-of-law was state law before Erie; the claim
that the Constitution requires “territorial choice-of-law rules”
because “[t]he allocation of authority among the states is terri23
24
torial;” and many other important points.
The Article is in four parts. Part I provides a comprehensive intellectual history of choice-of-law from this nation’s birth
until just before Erie and Klaxon. While there were some shifts
in how choice-of-law was conceptualized during this premodern era, choice-of-law during this time was understood in
ways that presumed it was uniform across all states, thereby
25
satisfying the Single System Requirement.
Part II shows what has transpired in choice-of-law following Klaxon’s determination that choice-of-law is state law: a
landslide of multiple and inconsistent choice-of-law regimes.
Part II also identifies four lessons that must inform a reconstructed federal body of choice-of-law. These lessons reflect important insights from the modern approaches that explain why
a simple return to the old system is not advisable, and why continuing to treat choice-of-law as state law is untenable.
Building on these insights, Part III explains why choice-oflaw is appropriately federal rather than state law. In the process, Part III shows that this Article’s approach provides an attractive solution to renvoi, one of the thorniest conceptual problems in choice-of-law. Part III then suggests that Klaxon has
been partially overruled by the 1948 Amendments to the Full
Faith and Credit Act, and argues that Klaxon should be wholly
choice-of-law in its essence polices states’ extraterritorial powers, (3) is
substantially responsible for determining the character of our federal union,
and (4) serves to maintain the health of our interstate system—three functions
that are best and appropriately discharged only by federal law.
21. See supra notes 18–19.
22. See infra note 76 (critiquing Trautman’s claim).
23. Laycock, supra note 15, at 316, 337; see infra notes 263–66(critiquing
this view).
24. Contrary to the positions of Horowitz, Trautman, and Laycock, this
Article’s primary claim is that two federal statutes authorize state and federal
courts to develop a uniform body of federal choice-of-law, and that the
resulting doctrines accordingly are not federal common law. See infra Part III.
Contrary to Professor Baxter, this Article argues that a federal statute
compels state courts to develop the federal common law of choice-of-law. See
Baxter, supra note 17, at 42 (“I cannot justify a federal compulsion [for state
courts to adopt any particular choice-of-law rules].”); infra Part III.D.1.
25. For one fleeting exception, see infra note 182.
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overruled so as not to interfere with the Rules of Decision Act.
The upshot is that two federal statutes authorize federal and
state courts to jointly create a single body of federal choice-oflaw. Part III also explains why choice-of-law would constitute
federal common law even without these statutes. Part IV anticipates possible objections, and explains why there is reason for
cautious optimism concerning domestic choice-of-law’s future.
I. PRE-MODERN AMERICAN UNDERSTANDINGS OF
CHOICE-OF-LAW
A. CHOICE-OF-LAW AS GENERAL LAW
1. The Concept of General Law
26

Erie’s rejection of “federal general common law” is an out27
growth of the Court’s adoption of legal positivism. Erie over28
turned Swift v. Tyson, the famed Justice Story opinion holding
that federal courts sitting in diversity were not bound by state
high court determinations of “general principles of commercial
29
law,” but could determine the general law on their own. Erie
said Swift’s rule rested on the “fallacy” that “there is a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but ob30
ligatory within it unless and until changed by statute” —which
was a “fallacy” because “law in the sense in which courts speak
of it today does not exist without some definite authority be31
hind it.” The “sense” to which Erie referred was “Austin’s legal
32
positivist conception of the nature of law” that law must be
33
traceable to some ruler or government. If neither “the Federal
26. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
27. See Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal
Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673, 674 n.7 (1998) (collecting scholars who tie Erie
to legal positivism). While Professors Goldsmith and Walt take a dissenting
view, arguing that “Erie’s commitment to legal positivism is conceptually and
normatively independent of its constitutional holding,” id. at 675, they “do not
deny that there might be a historical link between beliefs about legal
positivism and Erie’s holding,” particularly given “the language in the Erie
opinion.” Id. at 694. I discuss Erie’s language above in the text.
28. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
29. Id. at 18.
30. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Justice Holmes).
31. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Justice Holmes).
32. Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 27, at 673–74.
33. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 30
(Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1954) (“[C]ustomary laws, considered as positive law,
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34

Constitution [n]or . . . acts of Congress” provide the rule of decision in a case—but the common law does instead—such com35
mon law must be “the law of that State.” Because “the voice
adopted by the State as its own . . . should utter the last word”
as to its content, federal courts sitting in diversity must apply
the common law as understood by the highest courts of the
36
state in which they sit.
It is difficult today for people to comprehend “general law,”
much less to understand how it could have held such sway in
37
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. We are fortunate Professor Caleb Nelson has done so excellent a job expli38
cating the concept of general law. As Nelson explains, law in
39
the pre-Erie era was divided into “local” and “general.” Local
law included written (statutory and constitutional law), as well
40
as some “unwritten” law. Other aspects of unwritten law,
41
however, were “of a more general nature.” “General law” referred to that part of the unwritten law whose “rules [were] not
under the control of any single jurisdiction, but instead reflect[ed] principles or practices common to many different ju42
risdictions.” According to Blackstone’s influential account, the
rules of unwritten law “receive[d] their binding power, and the
force of laws, by long and immemorial usage, and by their uni43
versal reception throughout the kingdom.” Adapted to America, Blackstone’s received teaching was that general law was
“shaped from the bottom up by the very people who [were] sub-

are not commands. And, consequently, customary laws, considered as positive
law, are not laws or rules properly so called.”); Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State
Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 891
(2005) (“[T]he rise of positivistic legal thought led courts to conclude that all
law, including general law, must be attributable to a sovereign source.”).
34. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
35. Id. at 79.
36. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Justice Holmes).
37. See Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 929 (2013) (“To modern readers, the doctrine
articulated by Swift v. Tyson might seem baffling.”).
38. Id.
39. See id. at 925.
40. See id.
41. Id. (quoting Swift v. Tyson, (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842)).
42. Nelson, supra note 13, at 505.
43. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *64, quoted in Nelson, supra
note 37, at 931 n.34. Early Americans adopted, but also adapted in important
respects, this Blackstonian understanding. See id.
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ject to it (or their predecessors)” and grew “out of practices that
44
the people themselves ha[d] adopted over time.”
a. Private International Law
But why was there such thing as general law? The needs of
international commerce, in conjunction with pre-twentieth century conceptions of the territorial limits of sovereign powers,
are crucial parts of the answer. There long has been international commerce in which merchants from different polities engaged in multi-step transactions that spanned more than one
polity. For instance, G (from Germany) may have come to
France, where he agreed to buy goods from F (from France)
that were to be shipped from Britain to Germany, payable by a
bill of exchange upon the shipment’s completion. Such commerce required clarity as to the legal consequence of each step
in the business transaction, which in turn required predictability as to what law governed each step.
The subset of the law of nations known as private international law—comprising what today is called admiralty, commercial law, and conflict of laws—facilitated international
45
commerce by providing this needed predictability. Some parts
of a multi-step transnational transaction may have been regulated by the “local” law of a single polity. Choice-of-law principles determined which polity’s law applied, and aimed to ensure that the courts of all countries would come to the same
46
conclusion and thus apply that polity’s law. Other parts of a
44. Nelson, supra note 37, at 931; see also RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH
U. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW: THE DECLINE OF THE
DOCTRINES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM 66 (1977) (showing
that customary law was not laid down by the sovereign state, but emanated
from the people and was merely recognized by courts).
45. See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 44, at 51–52.
46. Id. at 52; see also 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 4 (1935) (“International commerce created the necessity for some
principle of law which should protect the interests and give effect to the
undertakings of the foreigner. . . . International trade could not be carried on
as has now become necessary unless the trader could be assured that he would
not be placed absolutely at the mercy of the vagaries or unknown
requirements of the local law, but would find a well-established body of law to
protect his rights. This body of law is the Conflict of Laws . . . .”); ERNEST G.
LORENZEN, Huber’s De Conflictu Legum, in SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 136, 160–61 (1947) (noting that most foreign conflicts
scholars aimed to adopt a “uniformity” of conflict of laws derived “from a
source that [was] superior to the internal law of each state, and this source
they conceive[d] to be International Law” so that “[i]nstead of being a part of
the internal law of each state, the rules of the Conflict of Laws constitute, in
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transaction may not have been regulated by any particular polity, but instead might have been governed by the uniform bod47
ies of transnational admiralty (primarily regarding transport
48
of goods) and commercial law.
Together, choice-of-law, admiralty, and commercial law
ensured that each step in a multi-state commercial transaction
would be governed by a single, knowable law. Predictability required that choice-of-law, admiralty, and commercial law be
uniform across all jurisdictions, which could occur only if these
three fields of law were not part of any single state’s legal system but instead were part of international law.
But if these three bodies of law were not part of a single
state’s legal system, what determined the law’s content? Scholars agree that the content of private international law arose
from a combination of merchant customs, judicial recognition of
such customs in case law, and the critical review of such cus49
toms and judicial decisions by scholars. The judicial role was
not limited to recognizing developed customs, but extended to
reasoning inductively from the “data points supplied by existing customs” to generate “broader principles” that might sug50
gest “answers to various questions of first impression.” These
merchant customs and judicial opinions were then rationalized,
organized, and sometimes critiqued by scholars and treatise51
writers worldwide. The needs of international commerce thus
drove the development of a legal system whose “rules [were]
not under the control of any single jurisdiction, but instead reflect[ed] principles or practices common to many different ju52
risdictions.”
their opinion, a universal system which imposes its rules upon the individual
states from without”).
47. An extra-state body of admiralty law arose because it was widely
believed at the time that a polity’s regulatory powers did not extend beyond its
physical borders. See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 44, at 53.
48. Scholars have posited several theories as to why extra-state
commercial law arose. See generally Mark D. Rosen, Do Codification and
Private International Law Leave Room for a New Law Merchant?, 5 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 83, 83–85 (2004) (summarizing these).
49. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS,
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES,
AND SPECIFICALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS,
SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS §§ 2–4 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James
Brown 3d ed. 1846).
50. Nelson, supra note 37, at 934.
51. See, e.g., STORY, supra note 49, §§ 12–16. For a list of earlier treatises
on which Story relied, see id. at xviii–xxii.
52. Nelson, supra note 13.
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b. General Law in the United States
Before Erie¸ a similar law-generating process that was independent of legislatures occurred within the United States in
53
what Swift called “general principles of commercial law.” Justice Story’s opinion in Swift distinguished between “state laws
strictly local”—“the positive statutes of the state, and the construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and . . . rights
and titles to things having a permanent locality, such as the
rights and titles to real estate, and other matters immovable
and intraterritorial in their nature and character”—and “questions of a more general nature” like “questions of general com54
mercial law . . . .” The latter was “not the law of a single coun55
try only, but of the commercial world.”
Understanding general law facilitates appreciation of
Swift’s conclusion that federal courts could exercise independent judgment as to the general law’s contents. To the extent
general law was a “matter of fact” concerning merchant cus56
tom, state courts were no better situated than federal courts
to make such determinations. Even where custom did not settle
the question, and courts had to reason inductively, “the state
tribunals [were] called upon to perform the like functions as
ourselves, that is, to ascertain, upon general reasoning and legal analogies . . . . . . what is the just rule furnished by the
57
principles of commercial law to govern the case.” Accordingly,
though decisions of state courts as to the general commercial
law were given the “most deliberate attention and respect of
58
this Court,” state case law did not bind federal courts.
2. Choice-of-Law As General Law in Nineteenth Century
America
As with commercial law, American courts in the pre-Erie
era conceptualized domestic choice-of-law as part of the general
law, and more specifically, as an extension of private interna53. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
54. Id. at 18–19.
55. Id. at 19.
56. See Michael Steven Green, Erie’s Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 1111, 1129 (2011) (noting that insofar as general law was based on
custom, it was to a large extent a “matter of fact,” and therefore “it was not
odd that Story thought that courts of different sovereigns could exercise their
own judgment about” the general law’s contents).
57. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19; see also id. (speaking of “the general
principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence”).
58. Id.; see also Nelson, supra note 37, at 944.
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59

tional law. Early American courts treated the international
law of choice-of-law as authoritative for purposes of determining domestic choice-of-law, and utilized reasoning consistent
with the understanding that choice-of-law was part of the gen60
eral law. To demonstrate this, this section provides a detailed
61
examination of two early cases, an analysis of two treatises,
and an overview of late nineteenth century case law. And because they conceptualized choice-of-law as general law, American courts’ efforts to discern that single body of choice-of-law
satisfied the Single System Requirement.
a. Nash v. Tupper
62

The 1803 New York case of Nash v. Tupper is both representative and instructive of choice-of-law’s connections to the
59. See David F. Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and the
Federal Courts, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 732, 737–38 (1963) (noting that
during the Swift era “choice-of-law questions fell into the domain of ‘general
law’”); Max Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L.
REV. 775, 805 (1955) (showing that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
“we find the terms ius gentium and Law of Nations applied to that body of
legal rules and principles which we now call the ‘law of conflict of laws’ or
‘private international law.’”); see also Lea Brilmayer, Methods and Objectives
in the Conflict of Laws: A Challenge, 35 MERCER L. REV. 555 (1984); Michael
Steven Green, Choice of Law As General Common Law: A Reply to Professor
Brilmayer, in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 (Donald Earl
Childress III ed., 2012). Most of the modern scholars who have observed
choice-of-law’s original connection to general law were not focused on choiceof-law, but mentioned this in passing in the course of larger projects
concerning federal common law. See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 44, at
61–97; Bellia, supra note 33, at 889–90 (“General law, or the law of nations,
governed matters that courts today categorize as . . . conflict of laws, and
private international law.”). This Article presents evidence that supports these
scholars’ observations concerning the general law character of early choice-oflaw jurisprudence in this country.
60. See Baxter, supra note 17, at 29–30 (“Choice rules were regarded not
merely as general rather than local law but as part of a still more august and
transcendent body of principle, the law of nations.”).
61. Many others might be cited. See, e.g., Harvey v. Richards, 11 F. Cas.
746, 759 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818) (No. 6184) (Story, J.) (“[T]he question . . . is
properly [one] of international law, dependent upon no local usages, but
resting on general principles.”), cited in Baxter, supra note 17, at 30;
Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. (12 Tyng) 1, 4–8 (1816) (Parker, C.J.)
(explaining that “the laws of any State cannot, by any inherent authority, be
entitled to respect extraterritorially, or beyond the jurisdiction of the State
which enacts them, is the necessary result of the independence of distinct
sovereignties,” considering what occurs “when a merchant of France, Holland,
or England, enters into a contract in his own country” and proceeding to
analyze English laws on the choice of law issue).
62. 1 Cai. 402 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803).
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general law of private international law. The plaintiff sued in
New York for promissory notes made in Connecticut. The parties agreed that the notes were governed by Connecticut law,
but disagreed as to whether Connecticut’s longer statute of limitations applied, or whether the lawsuit had to be dismissed on
account of the forum’s shorter statute of limitations.
Private international law was central to the court’s analysis. The majority opinion began by stating:
It is a well settled rule, that contracts, with a few exceptions, are
to be construed according to the laws of that country, in reference to
which they are made. But it is equally well settled, that the remedy
on them must be prosecuted according to the laws of that country in
63
which the remedy is sought.
64

The first cited case, Dupleix v. De Roven, concerned a
Roman contract sued upon in a British court, which dismissed
65
the action on account of England’s statute-of-limitations. The
majority then cited a single New York case that similarly had
applied the forum’s statute of limitations to a promissory note
that had been made in another state. Notwithstanding the
lawyers’ and dissent’s lengthy arguments against the rule that
forum law governed statutes of limitations, the majority summarily asserted that “[t]he correctness of those decisions”—
meaning the single New York case as well as the British deci66
sion—“I feel no disposition to controvert.” The majority
“conceiv[ed] the law on the point as settled,” noting that “with
this opinion the Scotch and Dutch laws accord, as will appear
from Erskine’s Institutes, vol. 2, 581, 582; Kaime[s]’s’ Equity,
vol. 2, 358; Huberi Prælectiones, vol. 2, book 1, tit. 3; De
67
Conflictu Legum, sec. 7.”
Dissenting Judge Livingston similarly relied on the general
law of private international law. “In the exposition of foreign
contracts, courts take notice of the laws of the state in which
they are made, or manifest injustice would ensue. This is a dictate of common sense, and is become a principle of general
68
law.” Forum law applies regarding “the forms of the country
where the action is depending; . . . but in deciding on the mer63. Id. at 412 (Lewis, C.J.).
64. Dupleix v. De Roven, (1705) 23 Eng. Rep. 950 (Ch.); 2 Vern. 540.
65. For a description of the facts that varies from what is reported in
Nash, see Le Roy v. Crowninshield, 15 F. Cas. 362, 365 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820)
(No. 8269) (Story, J).
66. Nash, 1 Cai. at 413.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 414 (Livingston, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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69

its, the lex loci will be the rule.” Judge Livingston claimed
“[t]his distinction is found in the Roman and French law, and
Emerigon”—an eighteenth century advocate in the Parliament
70
of Aix-en-Provence —“speaks of it as adopted by all elementary
71
writers.” After quoting two treatises in their original languages of French and Latin, Judge Livingston proceeded to
Emerigon’s discussion of a lawsuit in French courts between
two Englishmen concerning a contract made in England in
which the French court upheld the contract notwithstanding its
nonconformance with France’s statute of frauds. “On a point of
general law, where we have no rule to the contrary, I cannot
well err in conforming to one which we find adopted by a for72
eign tribunal . . . .”
b. Le Roy v. Crowninshield
73

Consider next the 1820 case of Le Roy v. Crowninshield.
This decision is particularly instructive for our purposes because it was written by Justice Story—who thirteen years later
would publish a treatise on conflict of laws that would prove
74
enormously influential in the United States, and nine years
after that would write Swift v. Tyson, which relied so heavily
75
on general law. Story, like the judges in Crowninshield, understood domestic choice-of-law to be part of the general law of
76
private international law.
Crowninshield addressed the mirror image question at issue in Nash: whether the forum would apply its longer statute
of limitations to allow a contract action that would have been
barred under the statute of limitations of the state where the
contract had been made. Like the judges in Nash, Story treated
international choice-of-law as determinative, and otherwise
reasoned in a manner that reflected his understanding that it
was general law. Like Nash, Story’s analysis begins with private international law: “personal contracts are to have the
same validity, interpretation and obligatory force in every other
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. See STORY, supra note 49, at xix.
71. Nash, 1 Cai. at 414.
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. 15 F. Cas. 362 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (No. 8269) (1820) (Story, J.).
74. See STORY, supra note 49.
75. See supra notes 53–58.
76. Professor Trautman accordingly is mistaken when he says Justice
Story treated choice-of-law as state law. See Trautman, Toward Federalizing,
supra note 14, at 1715–16.
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country, which they have in the country where they are
77
made . . . .” Reflecting choice-of-law’s connection to the other
components of private international law, Story explained that
“the necessities of the civilized and commercial world rendered
78
[this principle] indispensable.”
But, continued Story, “[a]nother rule equally well settled
is, that remedies on contracts are to be regulated and pursued
according to the law of the place, where the action is instituted,
79
and not by the law of the place, where the contract is made.”
Story’s explanation was tied to the rule’s source in private international law:
Courts of law are instituted by every nation for its own convenience
and benefit, and the nature of the remedies, and the time and manner
of the proceedings, are regulated by its own views of justice and propriety, and fashioned by its own wants and customs. It is not obliged
to depart from its own notions of judicial order, from mere comity to
80
any foreign nation.

The party who seeks a remedy “must bring himself within
the prescription [under forum law], that limits it, and if he does
not . . . the prescription” bars him from recovering because “the
laws of one country cannot in themselves have any extraterri81
torial force” in another country, and “‘every case that comes
under our law must be decided by that law, and not by the law
82
of any other country.’” Foreign cases and treatises comprised
83
the bulk of Story’s sources.
Particularly instructive of Justice Story’s conceptualization
of choice-of-law as general law was the determinative role
84
played by “well established” practices. Story identified the two
main arguments traditionally made in support of the rule that
85
statutes of limitations are provided by the forum, and then
77. Crowninshield, 15. F. Cas. at 364.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 364–65.
80. Id. at 365 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 365–66.
82. Id. at 365 (quoting Principles of Equity, a treatise by eighteenth
century British jurist Lord Kaimes).
83. See id. at 365–68 (citing Lord Kaimes’s Principles of Equity, John
Erskine’s Institutes, Dutch jurist Ulricus Huberus’s De Conflictu Legum,
Genoan writer Joseph Casaregis’s Discursus Legales de Commercio, French
advocate Balthazard Emerigon’s Traite des Assurances, Dutch writer Paul
Voet’s De Statutis et Eorum Concursu, and works by Robert Pothier and
Johannes Heineccius, as well as cases from many different countries).
84. Id. at 364.
85. Id. at 368. The arguments are that “statutes of limitation belong to
the regulations of process in every state, and limit the judicial order of
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spends more than 3,000 words refuting them. Notably, however, Story ultimately applies the rule with which he disagrees
because “the question now before the court has been settled, so
far as it could be, by authorities, which the court is bound to re87
spect.” And what are these authoritative sources? Story first
cites to the foreign treatise writers Huberus, Voet, and Kaimes,
then “look[s] to the decisions at the common law”—by which he
means English decisions—and only after all this turns to “the
decisions in our own courts,” first considering three New York
cases before coming to a single decision “directly in point” by
Massachusetts’s highest court, the state in which the federal
88
court was sitting. Story states “these authorities are too stringent and obstinate to be easily resisted,” and concludes “I feel
myself, therefore, constrained to” apply forum law, which al89
lowed the lawsuit to go forward.
Presaging his opinion in Swift, Story does not treat the
choice-of-law question before the federal circuit court as a matter of state law, nor as a question whose resolution was to be
provided by the highest state court in which the federal court
sat; the Massachusetts decision was the absolute last datum
that Story’s opinion considered, and received but cursory
90
treatment in a single short paragraph. Story’s approach in Le
91
Roy thus is at loggerheads with Klaxon.
Further, Story did not adopt the lex fori rule because the
treatise writers and earlier decisions had convinced him that
their approach was correct, or because their virtual unanimity
gave him some doubts as to his preferred approach. To the contrary, he thought his view was the most sensible as a matter of
92
“principle.” Nevertheless, insisted Story:
My humbler and safer duty is to administer the law as I find it,
and to follow in the path of authority, where it is clearly defined, even
though that path may have been explored by guides, in whose judg-

proceedings in their courts” and that “statutes of limitation extinguish the
remedy only, and not the right, upon contracts.” Id.
86. See id. at 368–71 (concluding “[t]hat where all remedies are barred, or
discharged by the lex loci contractus, and have operated on the case, there the
bar may be pleaded by the debtor in a foreign tribunal, to repel any suit
brought to enforce the debt”).
87. Id. at 371.
88. Id. at 371–72.
89. Id. at 372.
90. See id.
91. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
92. See Crowninshield, 15 F. Cas. at 371.
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ment the most implicit confidence might not have been originally
93
reposed.

That Story thought “the question now before the court
has been settled, so far as it could
be, by authorities, which
94
the court is bound to respect” shows that he believed these
foreign treatise writers and international cases95 were authorities that governed the question at hand; in other
words, domestic choice-of-law was continuous with international choice-of-law doctrine. And what determined the contents of choice-of-law was not principle or rationality, 96
but
what was determinative for general law: settled practice.
c. Treatises
i.

Samuel Livermore’s Dissertations

Samuel Livermore published the first American treatise on
97
choice-of-law in 1828. Like the court opinions just canvassed,
Livermore treated domestic choice-of-law as an aspect of the
conflicts law that had been developed by foreign scholars and
jurists. This is revealed in his treatise’s title: Dissertations on
the Questions Which Arise from the Contrariety of the Positive
Laws of Different States and Nations. Livermore’s methodology
was reflective of this understanding. The introduction explains
that the treatise “present[s] to the profession a view of the
98
principles maintained by the great jurisconsults of Europe.”
Livermore describes his topic in a manner consistent with the
concept of general law, explaining that he “attempt[s] to estab99
100
lish true and certain principles” and “general principles.”
Livermore draws on German, French, and Dutch scholars in

93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. Id.
95. See id. (“The error, if any has been committed, is too strongly
engrafted into the law, to be removed without the interposition of some
superior authority.”).
96. Story’s treatise endorsed the rule he thought to have been wrong in Le
Roy, see STORY, supra note 49, at 971–73 (explaining that statutes of
limitations address the “remedy” and “right of action” and accordingly are
governed by the lex fori), with a caveat not relevant here.
97. See SAMUEL LIVERMORE, DISSERTATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS WHICH
ARISE FROM THE CONTRARIETY OF THE POSITIVE LAWS OF DIFFERENT STATES
AND NATIONS (New Orleans, Benjamin Levy 1828). Livermore’s treatise was
not successful. See 3 BEALE, supra note 46, at 1911.
98. LIVERMORE, supra note 97, at 20. Livermore also provides his own
“reflections” and “considerations.” Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 165.
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determining the rules he believes to be applicable to domestic
101
choice-of-law.
ii. Joseph Story’s Commentaries on Conflicts of Laws
Story’s Le Roy opinion presages the general law approach
found in Story’s great treatise on conflicts-of-law, which was
102
first published in 1834. At the treatise’s start, Story describes
conflicts-of-law as “belong[ing] to a branch of international ju103
Consistent with this, the treatise relies
risprudence . . . .”
first and foremost on foreign sources. Typically, the treatise
first reviews the foreign treatise writers, then proceeds to for104
eign case law, and only thereafter considers American cases.
Story states he aims to identify the “best established ap105
proach” and the “principle[s] generally recognised by all na106
tions,” and adopts practices that are widespread even if he
107
disagrees with them. Story hoped the treatise would be of use
to non-American lawyers in their legal practices outside of the
108
United States. The treatise in fact had immense influence on
109
European thought, particularly in France and Germany.
101. See, e.g., id. at 21–36 (consulting sources from all these countries to
determine the circumstances under which one state is obligated to give effect
to laws from another state); id. at 37–38 (considering French and Italian
scholars’ writings to determine choice-of-law question arising in Louisiana); id.
at 164–71 (consulting foreign writers to determine whether payment of debts
of an insolvent testator decided on basis of law of debtor’s domicile or place
where debts arose).
102. Chancellor Kent’s Commentaries occasionally addressed choice-of-law,
but did not do so in a systematic manner, and was only infrequently
referenced by Story. See, e.g., 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW 453–68 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 12th ed. 1873)
(providing extensive discussion of principle of lex loci to contracts in midst of
lectures on personal property); Baxter, supra note 17, at 26 (noting that Kent’s
Commentaries “contain[] only isolated references to choice rules scattered
throughout the various lectures on substantive topics”). For a comprehensive
list of the foreign treatises on which Story relies, see STORY, supra note 49, at
xviii–xxii.
103. STORY, supra note 49, at xi.
104. See, e.g., id. §§ 39–106 (evaluating the rules concerning domicile and
capacity). For more evidence of Story’s profound reliance on foreign sources,
see infra notes 215–25 & 240–50 (showing that foreign sources provided the
conceptual foundation of Story’s choice-of-law approach, what this Article dubs
the ‘anti-extraterritorialism maxim’) .
105. STORY, supra note 49, § 63.
106. Id. § 64; see also id. § 586 (looking to identify “the general assent of
civilized nations in modern times”).
107. See, e.g., supra note 96.
108. See, e.g., STORY, supra note 49, at xiv (enumerating important nonEnglish treatise writers, and observing that “I am not aware, that the works of
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iii. Francis Wharton’s Treatise
An influential American treatise published by Francis
Wharton in 1872 continued to reflect the understanding that
choice-of-law was part of the general law of private international law. Just note the treatise’s title: Conflict of Laws, or
Private International Law, Including a Comparative View of
Anglo-American, Roman, German, and French Jurisprudence.
Wharton’s preface speaks of “[t]he general European authoritativeness” of the “complex, but most philosophic system of jurisprudence, which has grown up in Germany, for the determina110
tion of Private International relations.” Wharton accordingly
look[s] to the Anglo-American law on the one side, and that of Germany on the other, as the principal factors in that common basis of
jurisprudence to which all who travel or do business in foreign lands
must appeal, and which—so far as founded on right reason—must be
largely influential in determining the private international relations
111
of the States of the American Union.

d. Choice-of-Law in Late Nineteenth Century America
American decisions throughout the nineteenth century
continued to treat domestic choice-of-law as part of the general
law of private international law. The American decisions of this
112
period regularly cited to the treatises of Wharton and Story,
and also continued to treat as authoritative the private inter113
national law found in foreign cases. In the other direction,
American cases also consulted purely domestic choice-of-law
decisions (in conjunction with foreign materials) to determine
these eminent Jurists have been cited at the English Bar,” and asking “[h]ow
it should happen, that, in this age, English Lawyers should be so utterly
indifferent to all foreign jurisprudence” insofar as “[m]any occasions are
constantly occurring, in which they would derive essential assistance from it,
to illustrate the questions, which are brought into contestation in all their
Courts.”).
109. 3 BEALE, supra note 46.
110. FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, OR
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, INCLUDING A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF ANGLOAMERICAN, ROMAN, GERMAN, AND FRENCH JURISPRUDENCE ii (1872).
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Seeman v. Phila. Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403, 408 (1927)
(relying on Wharton); Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 130–33 (1882)
(relying heavily on both Wharton’s and Story’s treatises); Milliken v. Pratt,
125 Mass. 374, 381 (1878) (relying on Story).
113. See, e.g., Pritchard, 106 U.S. at 130–38 (citing both foreign and
domestic choice-of-law decisions to determine rule for purely domestic choiceof-law question); Milliken, 125 Mass. at 377–80 (first consulting English
decisions before considering domestic case law).
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114

international choice-of-law rules. These practices are perfectly consistent with domestic choice-of-law having been understood at that time as being part of the general private international law.
Late nineteenth century choice-of-law decisions did not,
however, look identical to those of fifty years before. As Story’s
and Wharton’s treatises on conflicts-of-law grew increasingly
influential, and as the number of domestic choice-of-law decisions multiplied, the influence of these domestic sources increased, and American cases turned with less frequency to for115
eign case law. Late nineteenth century decisions accordingly
do not typically exhibit the degree of reliance on international
materials shown in the Nash and Crowninshield decisions,
116
though foreign citations were still frequent.
But late nineteenth century decisions still treated choiceof-law as general law, aiming to discern widespread practice rather than focusing on how cases in their particular jurisdiction
117
had answered the question. For example, when the United
States Supreme Court made choice-of-law determinations upon
reviewing appeals from diversity actions, it treated case law
from other jurisdictions (both domestic states and foreign coun118
Consider as well that the United
tries) as authoritative.
States Supreme Court approvingly noted when state courts had
approved of the choice-of-law rules that it—the United States

114. See, e.g., London Assurance v. Companhia de Moagens do Barreiro,
167 U.S. 149, 160–61 (1897) (citing to a domestic choice-of-law decision to
determine whether English or American law applied to the insurance
contract); Liverpool & Great W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397,
447–58 (1889) (analyzing both foreign and purely domestic choice-of-law
decisions to determine whether British or American law determined whether
common carriers can contractually exempt themselves from their own
negligence).
115. See cases discussed supra note 112.
116. See, e.g., Scudder v. Union Nat’l Bank, 91 U.S. 406, 410–13 (1875)
(consulting mostly domestic case law to determine which state’s law applied to
decide the validity of a bill of exchange, but also considering English
decisions).
117. See, e.g., Liverpool, 129 U.S. at 458 (noting that its choice-of-law rule
was consistent with “the great preponderance, if not the uniform concurrence,
of authority”); Pritchard, 106 U.S. at 130–38; Scudder, 91 U.S. at 410–13;
Milliken, 125 Mass. at 377–83 (reviewing case law from other countries and
other states).
118. See, e.g., Hall v. Cordell, 142 U.S. 116, 120–21 (1891) (consulting state
cases to ascertain the choice-of-law rule); Pritchard, 106 U.S. at 130, 137–41
(same).
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Supreme Court—had earlier adopted. The Supreme Court also noted when foreign jurists approved of choice-of-law rules
120
that had been advocated in Story’s treatise. And when American courts adopted choice-of-law rules that differed from those
of other countries, foreign cases generally were not dismissed
as non-binding precedent, but instead were criticized to explain
121
why they were “entitled to little weight.” In other words, foreign cases were authoritative (albeit distinguishable), not irrelevant. The unspoken premise behind these approaches to case
law from other jurisdictions was that the American courts were
122
aiming to locate a single choice-of-law jurisprudence. The understanding that choice-of-law was general law, in other words,
led American courts to aim to locate a single body of law, thereby satisfying the Single System Requirement.
B. CHOICE-OF-LAW AS (GENERAL LAW-LIKE) STATE LAW
1. Joseph Beale’s Treatise and the (First) Restatement
The next comparably influential American conflicts schol123
ar was Joseph Beale, the Royall Professor of Law at Harvard,
124
author of a new treatise on conflicts-of-law, and the reporter
and main author of (what proved to be the first) Restatement of
the Conflicts of Law. Beale largely continued Story’s approach
125
to conflicts, but Beale’s treatise also reflects a crucial, though
119. See, e.g., Pritchard, 106 U.S. at 131 (noting a rule the Court had laid
down and that “its correctness was recognized by” a subsequently decided
North Carolina decision); see also id. at 139–41 (noting choice-of-law approach
adopted by the Supreme Court in two cases and then noting that “[t]hese cases
were relied on by the Supreme Court of New York” in a subsequent case).
120. See id. at 131 (noting Lord Brougham’s observation concerning “the
excellent distinction taken by Mr. Justice Story”).
121. Milliken, 125 Mass. at 381. But see Pritchard, 106 U.S. at 131 (noting
that continental Europe and England treated statutes of limitations
differently for purposes of choice-of-law).
122. This is not to suggest that the decisions in fact were uniform. See 2
BEALE, supra note 46, at 1108–09.
123. English scholar A.V. Dicey authored an important and influential
book, whose approach was largely adopted by Beale. See generally A.V. DICEY
& A. BERRIEDALE KEITH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1922). Many of the early
legal realists directed their energies to choice-of-law, but none had the shortterm influence of Beale.
124. See generally 1 BEALE, supra note 46.
125. See DAVID P. CURRIE, HERMA HILL KAY, LARRY KRAMER & KERMIT
ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 (8th ed. 2010). Beale rejected Story’s comity
approach, however, introducing in its place the concept of vested rights. See id.
For more on vested rights, see infra note 131.
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until now largely overlooked, reconceptualization of conflicts-oflaw: instead of viewing domestic conflicts law as part of the
general law of private international law, Beale thought that
126
“Conflict[s] of Laws [was] part of the law of each state,” more
127
specifically the “common law.”
To clarify Beale’s understanding, the first subpart considers why Beale abandoned the longstanding view that choice-oflaw was part of general private international law. The next
subpart explains Beale’s understanding of common law, and
shows why Beale’s reconceptualization did not, in his eyes at
least, undermine choice-of-law’s uniformity across states. Beale
had a “general law”-like conception of state common law, and
hence understood choice-of-law in a manner that satisfied the
Single System Requirement.
2. What Fueled Beale’s Reconceptualization of Choice-of-Law
a. Why It Wasn’t Legal Positivism
It is tempting to assume that Beale reconceptualized
choice-of-law from general law to state common law for the
same reason that Erie rejected general law: owing to legal positivist commitments that demanded that law be tied to some
128
sovereign. This is not so, for an examination of Beale’s philos129
ophy of law discloses that he was not a positivist. Excavating
Beale’s jurisprudence illuminates how Beale could have
thought choice-of-law would be predominantly uniform across
all jurisdictions (hence satisfying the Single System Requirement) despite its being state common law.
Beale understood legal positivism’s claim that law is “an
expression of sovereign will” to mean that law consists solely of
“the rules made by the legislative body,” and criticized positivism for “appear[ing] to ignore the principal element of law, the
130
so-called ‘unwritten law.’” Instead of positivism, Beale largely
endorsed Sir Frederick Pollock’s position, which Beale summarized as the view that law was the “sum of the rules binding

126. 1 BEALE, supra note 109, at 52.
127. Id. at 28.
128. See infra Part I.C.
129. Justice Frankfurter, a student of Beales while at Harvard Law School,
noted that Beale’s course on the Conflict of Laws was in essence a “course in
Jurisprudence.” Felix Frankfurter, Joseph Henry Beale, 56 HARV. L. REV. 701,
703 (1943).
130. 1 BEALE, supra note 46, at 22 (emphasis added).
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131

members of the state as such.” In Beale’s view, law comprised
three parts: “[l]aw . . . is made in part by the legislature; in part
it rests upon precedent; and in great part it consists in a homo132
geneous, scientific, and all-embracing body of principle . . . .”
Whereas legislation was the paradigm of law for legal positiv133
134
ists, Beale believed “principle” to be law’s essence. This is
attributable to Beale’s conception of law: “the one most important feature of law” is “that it is not a mere collection of ar135
bitrary rules, but a body of scientific principle.” Beale thought
the third component of law—principle—was a “branch of practical philosophy,” developed “through the use of reason and ex136
perience . . . .”
What puts Beale most at odds with legal positivism is his
view that the first two components of law endanger principle,
the third (and for him most important) component of law. “Purity of doctrine may be lost through wrong decisions of courts”
and “[t]he application of general principles may be inhibited by
137
legislation.” In other words, what legal positivists viewed as
the only legitimate sources of law endangered what Beale
138
thought to be the “most important feature of law.” Insofar as
he believed scientific principle and practical philosophy to constitute the core of law, Beale apparently thought law’s authority was self-generating, much like the laws of nature and morality. Beale accordingly thought law to be independent of the
sovereign state, contradicting legal positivism’s foundational
presupposition.

131. Id. at 25. Beale proposed one modification, which does not affect the
analysis that follows above in text: Beale thought that instead of saying that
“rules of law bind individuals,” it instead should be said that “[p]arties are
bound, not by the law, but by obligations created by the law.” Id. This
rephrasing reflects Beale’s understanding of the concept of “vested rights,”
which was an outgrowth of his view that laws could not have extraterritorial
application, though legal obligations could.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 22–23 (arguing that the positivist Austin “assimilat[ed]
judicial to statute law”).
134. See id. at 25 (“Much the largest and most important part of the law,
therefore, is this body of principle . . . .”).
135. Id. at 24–25.
136. Id. at 25.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 24–25.
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b. Domesticating Choice-of-Law
What led Beale to insist that conflict-of-laws was a part of
state law? Not a legal positivistic need to tie conflicts doctrine
to a sovereign, but a desire to disconnect the subject from foreign law. Consider the following bold statement from Beale’s
treatise: “It is sometimes urged that the doctrines of the Conflict of Laws have an international sanction, binding to some
extent upon the various states. This view is not today seriously
held and cannot be sustained. It has never been adopted by any
139
common-law authority.” Beale claims “the doctrines of foreign
law have influenced [choice-of-law] only as they have been considered by the authors of some of the treatises on the subject,
140
notably Story.” “The courts have developed the subject, as
they have developed any other topic of the common law, by the
course of decision,” and there have been only a “few cases
where the decision of the courts has been influenced by a doc141
trine foreign to the common law . . . .”
This Article is not the place to fully evaluate the historical
veracity of Beale’s claims. At the very least, Beale’s position is
inconsistent with the New York Justices’ approach in the Nash
case, and Justice Story’s approach in Crowninshield. Indeed,
whereas Beale goes so far as to argue that foreign authority
142
does not even have the status of “persuasive” precedent, Justice Story treated foreign materials as authoritative in his opinion in Crowninshield, and indeed throughout his extraordinarily influential treatise.
3. Beale’s Conception of the Common Law
Since Beale identified conflicts-of-law as an aspect of state
common law, fully comprehending his conception of common
law is necessary to appreciate his understanding of choice-oflaw. Two important lessons emerge. First, Beale’s idiosyncratic
understanding of common law was consistent with its being
both state law and essentially uniform across the country (and
hence consistent with the Single System Requirement). Second,
we will be able to understand why Beale gave no serious
139. Id. at 51.
140. Id.
141. Id. For Beale’s explanation as to why domestic choice-of-law was not a
part of international choice-of-law, see id. at 10–11, 51.
142. See id. at 52 (arguing that “there is nothing to be gained by the
citation of foreign authority as persuasive to the court in arriving at its
decision”).
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thought as to whether choice-of-law is federal law, but reflexively concluded it was state law.
Beale did not simply identify common law with judge-made
rules. Rather, common law referred to the “common elements”
143
found in the legal systems of England and the United States.
The common law encompassed “two kinds of unwritten law,”
namely the “law formulated by the courts” and “the general
144
body of legal precepts and legal thought.” The latter refers to
the principles and doctrine that constituted Beale’s third com145
ponent of law.
Another characteristic of common law, for Beale, was that
it was state law. Writing shortly before Erie, Beale’s treatise
contained a section entitled “Is There a Federal Common
146
Law?” To this he gives a swift (pardon the pun) unqualified
answer: no. Mischaracterizing Story’s approach in Swift v. Tyson, Beale claimed that Swift only held that “on ordinary questions of unwritten law . . . the federal courts were at liberty to
147
follow their own idea of the common law of the state . . . .”
Beale argued that “federal common law” was a misnomer.
“[T]he way in which it was decided, the weight given by the
[federal] court to the decisions of courts, and especially of federal courts, in other states, led lawyers to apply the name of
148
‘federal common law’ to the doctrine.” But Beale denied there
was “such thing as a [common] law of the nation apart from the
149
laws of the states.” This explains why once Beale determined
that choice-of-law was common law, he never considered
whether it was state or federal; on his understanding, common
law could only be state law. This Article’s third part identifies
the fallacy in Beale’s reasoning as it explains why choice-of-law
150
indeed could be federal common law.
Though Beale thought choice-of-law to be state common
law, his idiosyncratic understanding of common law led him to
expect that choice-of-law would be uniform nationwide. Beale
believed the common law comprised two parts. First, the com-

143. Id. at 10.
144. Id. at 26–27.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 132–36.
146. See 1 BEALE, supra note 46, at 25.
147. Id. at 26 (emphasis added); see also id. (stating that the law “thus
declared” by federal courts “was of course the law of the state”).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 26.
150. See infra Part III.A, III.B, & III.D.
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mon law was composed of the “common elements” across
151
states, with respect to which the “decisions of courts of all
152
such states are important evidences of the [common] law.” Second, Beale thought each state’s common law to be distinctive,
such that there was a “common law of New York, and a quite
153
distinct common law of Tennessee or of England . . . .” The
tensions in Beale’s account are plain: how can common law be
simultaneously common across the states and distinctive across
each? And if “[t]he doctrines of [the common] law are authoritative in each state whose law is based upon it,” how can each
state’s judicial decisions merely be “evidences of the [common]
154
law”?
The answer to these two questions is that Beale thought
the common law primarily consisted of the common elements,
with only relatively minor variations across states. Growing out
155
of his larger jurisprudence that we examined above, Beale
identified the common elements with “principle,” what he believed to constitute law’s core. It was as to principle that the
state courts’ decisions constituted merely “important evidences
156
of the [common] law.” It is worth noting how “general law”like Beale’s conception of this component of state common law
was. Indeed, in addition to the Swift-like conclusion that state
court decisions were mere evidence of this part of the common
157
law, Beale sometimes referred to the common elements as the
158
“general common law.” And Beale did not merely co-opt that
locution, but used it much as it had been deployed by Story and
others before him: the general common law was the “system
which is accepted by all so-called common-law jurisdictions but
159
is the particular and peculiar law of none . . . .” Thus, Beale
thought there was a single common law of New York and Ten-

151. 1 BEALE, supra note 46, at 10.
152. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 26–27.
154. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
155. See supra notes 130–36.
156. 1 BEALE, supra note 46, at 10.
157. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
158. 1 BEALE, supra note 46, at 27.
159. Id. (emphasis added). What set Beale’s understanding apart from his
predecessors was Beale’s exclusion of the civil law countries. See id. at 10. This
difference does not matter for the point at hand concerning Beale’s
expectation, like that of his predecessors, of uniformity within the United
States.
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160

nessee as to the “general common law.” It was only outside
the realm of principle that each state’s common law, as announced by their courts, could diverge (i.e., be “peculiar” and
161
“particular”).
So, notwithstanding Beale’s reconceptualization of choiceof-law as state law, Beale (like his predecessors) believed that
choice-of-law would be fundamentally uniform. Beale’s treatise,
as well as his efforts in the American Law Institute that culminated in the Restatement of Conflicts, aimed at developing robust “common elements”—a robust general common law—that
he expected would be uniform for all common law jurisdictions.
In short, Beale’s conception of state common law shared much
in common with the general law conception of choice-of-law
that long had prevailed. Beale conceptualized choice-of-law as
common law to disconnect it from foreign sources, not to render
choice-of-law heterogeneous across states. Beale’s understanding of choice-of-law, like his predecessors’, was largely consistent with the Single System Requirement.
To be sure, Beale recognized the possibility that mistaken
case law or wrongheaded legislation could create deviations
from the scientific body of principle and practical philosophy
162
that he labored to articulate. But he hoped that his treatise
and restatement would keep judicial errors to a minimum. And
as to legislation, Beale believed that “statutes altering the law
of a particular state within the domain of the Conflict of Laws
are very much less common than they are in most topics of the
163
law.” Beale undoubtedly hoped this would continue. Indeed,
though prominent scholars in Beale’s time were arguing that
Congress had power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s
164
Effects Clause to enact a federal choice-of-law statute, Beale’s

160. But see id. at 52 (“While the general principles of the common law as
developed by the states and as discussed in this treatise, are like the principles
of the common law in force in every common-law state, yet, like any principles
of the common law, they are subject to change either by legislation, by judicial
decision or by any of the other forces that change the particular law of a state.”
(emphasis added)).
161. Vis-à-vis such divergences, Beale presumably understood the
appellation “common law” to refer to the fact that the rule was “unwritten”
insofar as its source did not come from the legislature. See id. at 26 (describing
the court-formulated law as one of “the two kinds of unwritten law”).
162. Id. at 52–53.
163. Id. at 53.
164. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 1, at 428.
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treatise is silent on this subject. Beale evidently distrusted
Congress as much as he distrusted state legislatures. It was
principle—the common elements—that Beale hoped and expected would form the core of choice-of-law.
For all these reasons, choice-of-law’s status as state law did
not, for Beale, mean that there would be a multiplicity of
choice-of-law doctrines across states. But as we shall soon see,
Beale’s expectations regarding widespread “common elements,”
and hence uniformity, of choice-of-law were to be sharply dis166
appointed.
C. CHOICE-OF-LAW AS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Thus far we have seen that domestic choice-of-law long was
understood to be a part of the “general law” of private international law. Beale pivoted, believing choice-of-law to be state
common law, but his conception of common law shared many
characteristics of the general law, most importantly an expectation of cross-state uniformity that did not violate the Single
System Requirement. There is a third way choice-of-law was
briefly conceptualized in the pre-modern period: as constitutional law.
It has been suggested that the United States Supreme
Court began to constitutionalize choice-of-law in the late nine167
teenth century, but this is mistaken for two reasons. First,
careful study of the cases cited for this proposition shows that
they did not concern choice-of-law, but addressed different is168
sues. Second, the Court decided tens of cases between 1875
and 1928 in which it resolved choice-of-law questions without
169
adverting to the Constitution.
165. See 1 BEALE, supra note 46, at 278 (not mentioning Congress’s powers
under the Effects Clause when discussing the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
166. See infra Part II.B.
167. See Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking
Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2504 & n.238 (1999).
168. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), concerned due process
limits on the scope of states’ regulatory jurisdiction. See id. at 587–90 (holding
that Louisiana was without power to apply its law to an insurance contract
entered into in New York). Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119
U.S. 615, 622 (1877), held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause required the
forum to take evidence concerning non-forum law, but did not indicate what
state’s law would have to be applied. And Green v. Van Buskirk, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 307, 313–14 (1866), addressed how the forum had to treat another
state’s judgment, not another state’s laws.
169. For a helpful examination of the Court’s choice-of-law decisions
concerning contracts, see 2 BEALE, supra note 46, at 1106–09. An examination
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However, the Court (almost) unquestionably began treat170
ing choice-of-law as constitutional law in the 1930s. The
clearest example is the 1932 case of Bradford Electric Light Co.
171
v. Clapper, which held that a New Hampshire state court was
constitutionally required to apply a Vermont workers compensation statute to a worker accident that had occurred in New
172
Hampshire. The Court required the forum to apply non-forum
law because “full faith and credit [must] be given to the public
173
act of Vermont . . . .” Clapper and several other decisions “led
the American Law Institute in 1934 to reserve the question
whether every problem in conflict of laws had become a ques174
tion of constitutional law.”
Given the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s categorical language—“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
175
the public Acts . . . of every other State” —one might wonder
why the Full Faith and Credit Clause had not been invoked by
American courts whenever they confronted a domestic choice-oflaw question. This is a good question, about which three things
can be said.
First, the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not in fact play
any role in resolving domestic choice-of-law questions in the
United States prior to Clapper. The cases surveyed and referenced above are fully representative of this: choice-of-law decisions were made in consultation with foreign sources, or by
otherwise seeking “general” principles, but not by considering
of these cases discloses that the Court decided choice-of-law without adverting
to the Constitution.
170. I have argued previously that these cases are best understood as
federal common law rather than constitutional law, and continue to believe
this to be so. See Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?)
Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal
Actors That Determine What the Constitution Requires, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 915,
957–75 (2006); see also Mark D. Rosen, Congress’s Primary Role in
Determining What Full Faith and Credit Requires: An Additional Argument,
41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 7, 8–28 (2010) [hereinafter Rosen, Congress’s Primary
Role]. The main point made above in text is unaffected whether this case law
is understood to be constitutional law or federal common law because, either
way, choice-of-law was conceptualized consistently with the Single System
Requirement. That the Court’s Full Faith and Credit jurisprudence is best understood as federal common law means that overturning Klaxon would result
in less doctrinal disruption than might otherwise appear.
171. 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
172. Id. at 159.
173. Id.
174. Cheatham, Federal Control, supra note 17, at 587.
175. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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176

Likewise, Justice Story’s
what the Constitution required.
monumental treatise says absolutely nothing about the Full
Faith and Credit Clause’s application to sister states’ legislation; it only addresses that Clause’s requirements as to judg177
ments issued by another state’s courts, a subject distinct from
choice-of-law.
Second, doctrinal considerations explain Full Faith and
Credit’s long time absence from choice-of-law. In an excellent
recent article that builds upon the work of many other scholars,
David Engdahl persuasively argues that the original and early
understanding was that “full faith and credit” meant only that
American courts were required to treat sister-state acts as pri178
ma facie evidence. On this view, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause did not mandate that a forum give effect to sister state
179
180
legislation, and hence was not relevant to choice-of-law.
This explains why American choice-of-law decisions of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not appeal to the Con181
stitution, and raises questions as to why Clapper did.
Third, Clapper’s move to constitutionalize choice-of-law
was short-lived. Clapper did not acknowledge that its approach
182
of constitutionalizing choice-of-law was a break with the past,
176. See supra Part I.A.2.
177. And as to that, Justice Story literally dedicates only a single
paragraph! See STORY, supra note 49, § 609.
178. See David E. Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 YALE
L.J. 1584 (2009); see also STORY, supra note 49, at 1004–05 (“The Constitution
. . . did not make the judgments of other states domestic judgments to all
intents and purposes; but only gave a general validity, faith, and credit to
them, as evidence.”); Kurt H. Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments
and Public Acts: A Historical-Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33
(1957); Sachs, supra note 15, at 1206 & n.25. For a discussion of what it meant
for a judgment to be prima facie evidence, see Sachs, supra note 15, at 1252–
53.
179. See Engdahl, supra note 178, at 1609.
180. With one important caveat: the Clause gave Congress the power to
determine such effects. See id.
181. Of course the mere fact that Clapper effectuated a change does not on
its own mean that it was wrongly decided. Changed applications can be
legitimate even under originalist commitments, see JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING
ORIGINALISM (2011), and all the more so under non-originalist approaches.
182. Justice Brandeis, Clapper’s author, had stated in a 1916 opinion that
the claim that a state court had “made a mistaken application of doctrines of
the conflict of laws” was “purely a question of local common law . . . with which
this court is not concerned.” Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171, 176 (1916). This
proposition was not cited by the Supreme Court until after Klaxon, however,
and between Kryger and the aborted attempt to constitutionalize choice-of-law
the Supreme Court continued to treat choice-of-law as if it were a part of
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nor did it provide a clear rule for determining when a forum
183
was constitutionally required to apply non-forum law. In subsequent cases the Court fashioned a balancing test under which
choice-of-law was to be decided by “appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of deci184
sion according to their weight.” With only a few exceptions,
cases after Clapper held that the forum could apply forum law,
even where the non-forum had substantial interests in having
185
its law applied. Less than ten years after Clapper, the Court
definitively announced in Klaxon that choice-of-law was state
186
law.
II. MODERN AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW, AND FOUR
LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
Part I identified three different ways choice-of-law was
conceptualized in the pre-modern era: it long was understood to
be part of the general law of private international law, was
reconceptualized as state common law by Beale, and for a short
period was treated as federal constitutional law by the Sugeneral law, see, e.g., Seeman v. Phila. Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403, 407
(1927). In other words, Kryger’s identification of choice-of-law as state law was
but a fleeting blip until Klaxon.
183. Clapper ruled that full faith and credit required that a defendant be
able to invoke a defense available under non-forum law. See Bradford Elec.
Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 160 (1932). Clapper plausibly noted that
allowing plaintiff to circumvent the non-forum’s workman’s compensation
statute would mean that “the effectiveness of the [non-forum] Vermont Act
would be gravely impaired.” Id. at 159. But Clapper also stated “the full faith
and credit clause does not require the enforcement of every right conferred by
a statute of another state. There is room for some play of conflicting policies.”
Id. at 160.
184. Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532,
547 (1935).
185. See id.; see also Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306
U.S. 493, 504 (1939). For a scholarly treatment of these cases, see Paul A.
Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1210,
1219–25 (1946). For some of the few cases where the forum was required to
apply non-forum law, see Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331
U.S. 586 (1947) (holding the forum had to apply the law of the state of
incorporation of a fraternal benefit society); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 182–83 (1936) (requiring the forum to apply non-forum
law on the theory that non-forum statute became part of the terms of a
contract, not on a balancing of interests approach).
186. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). From that
time forward, the Constitution has not served as the source choice-of-law, but
has been understood to provide (exceedingly modest) limits on state choice-oflaw doctrines. For a discussion of these constitutional limits, see Rosen,
Congress’s Primary Role, supra note 170, at 14–16.
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preme Court. As different as they were, all three anticipated
that choice-of-law would be uniform nationwide; uniformity is
an inherent characteristic of general law and constitutional
law, and was Beale’s expectation because of his general lawlike conception of common law. All three conceptualizations of
choice-of-law thus satisfied the Single System Requirement.
Expectations of choice-of-law uniformity have been abandoned, however, in the modern era. This Part first explains how
and why our present “chaotic” system came about. As the first
subsection shows, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Klaxon and
Wells declared that choice-of-law was state law that could vary
from state to state. The next subsection demonstrates the many
different choice-of-law regimes that have since emerged, and
shows that they generate disparate outcomes. In the process,
the second subsection identifies four lessons that will prove
crucial to Part III’s argument that choice-of-law should be
reconceptualized as federal nonconstitutional law.
A. CHOICE-OF-LAW AS (HETEROGENEOUS) STATE LAW: KLAXON
AND WELLS
Choice-of-law’s modern era began in 1941, in the Supreme
Court’s decision of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufactur188
ing Co. Klaxon did two things, both of which this Article
sharply criticizes. First, Klaxon held that federal courts sitting
in diversity must apply the choice-of-law rules of the states in
which they are located. (Part III explains why this is wrong:
federal courts sitting in diversity must apply federal choice-oflaw rules.) Second, Klaxon held that choice-of-law is state
189
law. (Part III also explains why this is wrong: choice-of-law in
state courts is properly understood to be federal law).
Although Klaxon’s second holding, that choice-of-law is
state common law, superficially might sound as if the Court
had simply accepted Professor Beale’s approach, Klaxon had a
fundamentally different conception of common law, with implications orthogonal to Beale’s expectations. Whereas Beale understood the bulk of choice-of-law to be principles that would be
uniform across states, Klaxon did not. To the contrary, Klaxon
presupposed cross-state non-uniformity of choice-of-law. Klaxon
187. But see supra note 170.
188. Klaxon, 313 U.S. 487.
189. Id. at 497 (stating that federal courts must apply the choice-of-law
rules declared by the states in which they sit because “the proper function of
[a] federal court is to ascertain what the state law is”).
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justified its holding on the basis of Erie, which Klaxon described as establishing the “principle of uniformity within a
190
state” as between state and federal courts. Klaxon recognized
that its holding made possible a “lack of uniformity . . . between
191
federal courts in different states,” but thought this sort of
non-uniformity was “attributable to our federal system, which
leaves to a state . . . the right to pursue local policies diverging
192
from those of its neighbors.” Thus, under Klaxon, choice-oflaw was just another type of state law that might vary across
states. In Klaxon’s words, “[i]t is not for the federal courts to
thwart such local policies by enforcing an independent ‘general
193
law’ of conflict of laws.” Rather, each state “is free to determine whether a given matter is to be governed by the law of the
194
forum or some other law.”
Four observations are in order. First—to state the obvious—Klaxon’s conception of choice-of-law as state law marks a
bold break from the earlier understandings examined in Part I,
including Beale’s. Second, just as Clapper nine years earlier
had been silent about the novelty of its decision to constitutionalize choice-of-law, Klaxon did not acknowledge that it had propounded a fundamentally novel understanding of choice-of-law.
Third, Klaxon did not explain its conclusion that choice-of-law
was state law; it simply asserted so in the ipse dixit language
reproduced just above. Fourth, Klaxon’s very short opinion did
not consider the full range of possibilities. Klaxon rejected the
view that federal courts could “enforce[e] an independent ‘gen195
eral law’ of conflict of laws,” but did not consider that federal
courts could announce a non-constitutional federal rule that
would be binding on—and hence not independent of—state
courts. It is this unconsidered possibility that Part III develops.
These four observations are consistent with something
else: that Klaxon was decided very quickly. Briefs were submitted on April 10 and 19, oral argument was heard on May 1 and
2, and the Court handed down its opinion only one month later,

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
rule.

Id. at 496.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 497.
Id. at 496. Klaxon plainly meant “independent” of the state’s conflicts
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196

on June 2. Consistent with the published decision’s tenor, the
parties’ briefs focused almost exclusively on Erie, and gave little attention to choice-of-law. The core question was whether
197
choice-of-law was “substantive or procedural.” The parties
paid virtually no attention to the nature of choice-of-law, apart
from a fleeting reference to Beale’s treatise and dictum from a
198
prior Supreme Court decision. Ironically—and troublingly—
while Klaxon focused primarily on Erie, its most lasting implications have been on choice-of-law.
Klaxon was unanimous, but three Justices in effect dissented from its holding twelve years later in Wells v. Simonds
199
The plaintiff in Wells asserted a statutory
Abrasive Co.
wrongful death claim under Alabama law in a Pennsylvania
federal court. Pennsylvania had a shorter statute-of-limitations
than Alabama, and Pennsylvania’s choice-of-law rule provided
that statutes-of-limitations were governed by forum law. The
majority followed Klaxon, stating “[t]he states are free to adopt
such rules of conflict of laws as they choose” and requiring the
200
federal court to apply Pennsylvania law. Justice Jackson and
two others dissented, thinking the Full Faith and Credit Clause
201
required application of Alabama’s statute-of-limitations.
Jackson acknowledged Klaxon “contain[ed] language that
would seem to make all conflict questions depend on the law of
the forum,” but distinguished it—or, more accurately, aimed to
narrow it to its facts—by noting that Klaxon concerned “an action on contract” and hence was “but dictum so far as it touches
202
this statutory tort case.”
Two things are worth noting. First, Wells established that
Klaxon’s dual holdings—that choice-of-law is state law, and
that states may select “such rules of conflict of laws as they
203
choose” —applied to the entire range of choice-of-law, by
196. See id. at 487; Brief for Petitioner, Klaxon, 313 U.S. 487 (No. 741)
1941 WL 76680; Respondent’s Brief, Klaxon, 313 U.S. 487 (No. 741) 1941 WL
76681.
197. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 196, at *4.
198. See id. The earlier decision was Kryger, which I discuss supra note
182.
199. 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
200. Id. at 516.
201. See id. at 521–22 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (concluding that the full
faith and credit “requir[es] that the law where the cause of action arose will
follow the cause of action in whatever forum it is pursued”).
202. Id. at 520–21 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 516 (majority opinion).
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which I mean state laws grounded in both legislation and common law. Second, both the majority and dissent in Wells confined their analysis to constitutional analysis. No Justice considered the possibility, defended in Part III, that nonconstitutional federal law determined the issue.
B. TODAY’S MANY APPROACHES TO CHOICE-OF-LAW
Soon after Klaxon’s declaration that choice-of-law was state
204
law, all hell broke loose : a “revolution” occurred in choice-oflaw in which the fundaments of Beale’s (and Story’s) approach
were rejected, and replaced by not one alternative, but a multi205
plicity of contenders. The full story of this revolution has been
206
told well before, and I do not intend to repeat it here. I provide a partial recounting for two reasons: (1) to definitively establish the heterogeneity of contemporary choice-of-law in the
United States, and (2) to identify four lessons fundamental to
Part
III’s
argument
that
choice-of-law
should
be
reconceptualized as non-constitutional federal law. Both tasks
are best accomplished by considering how each of today’s
choice-of-law methodologies would apply to a single concrete
case. I shall use the well-known late nineteenth-century case of
207
Milliken v. Pratt.
Here are Milliken’s facts. Married women did not have the
capacity to contract under Massachusetts law, but did under
208
Maine law. Mr. and Mrs. Pratt resided in Massachusetts,
209
Milliken in Maine. Mr. Pratt and Milliken agreed that Milliken would sell certain goods to Mr. Pratt on credit, but only if
210
Mrs. Pratt guaranteed her husband’s payment. Mrs. Pratt
signed and handed her husband a guaranty contract, which he
then deposited in a mailbox near their home in Massachu204. This is not to suggest the field was orderly before. Writing in 1924,
Ernest Lorenzen observed that “[t]here are, relatively speaking, few rules of
the Conflict of Laws which can be said to be recognized by all Anglo-American
states, or by the great majority of them.” LORENZEN, supra note 46, at 11–12.
205. Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 772, 775 (1983) (approvingly observing that “[i]t is a commonplace in
contemporary conflict-of-laws discourse that we are witnessing a ‘revolution’
in the branch of that subject known as choice of law”).
206. See id. at 802–39 (discussing critiques of Beale’s territorialism and the
emergence of interest analysis, the Second Restatement, lex fori, and Leflar’s
“better law” approach).
207. 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
208. Id. at 376–77.
209. Id. at 374.
210. Id.
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setts. After receiving Mrs. Pratt’s contract in the mail in
Maine, Milliken shipped the goods to Mr. Pratt, who thereafter
212
failed to make payment. When Milliken sued in a Massachusetts court to enforce Mrs. Pratt’s guaranty contract, she argued it was invalid on the ground that married women did not
213
have the capacity to make contracts. The choice-of-law question before the court was whether Massachusetts law governed
the contract’s validity, in which case Mrs. Pratt would prevail,
or whether Maine law applied, in which case the guaranty con214
tract was valid and Mr. Milliken would win.
1. Territorialism
The actual court in Milliken relied on Story’s treatise, applying what has come to be known as the “territorialist” approach to choice-of-law. For our purposes, it will be useful to
examine the presuppositions behind Story’s methodology before
turning to the court’s analysis.
a. Presuppositions and Description
Near the beginning of his treatise, Justice Story wrote,
“[b]efore entering upon any examination of the various heads,
which a treatise upon the Conflict of Laws will naturally embrace, it seems necessary to advert to a few general maxims or
axioms, which constitute the basis, upon which all reasonings
215
on the subject must necessarily rest . . . .” Two are of interest
to us. First, relying primarily on the seventeenth-century
216
Dutch scholar Ulrich Huber, Story asserted “[t]he first and
most general maxim or proposition is that . . . every nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own
217
territory.” Story thought this international law principle ap218
plied fully to sister states, and hence that “the laws of every
211. Id.
212. Id. at 375.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 377.
215. STORY, supra note 49, § 17.
216. See id. §§ 29, 31; LORENZEN, supra note 46, at 155 (“Story gives to
[Huber’s] maxims his unqualified assent”). To be more precise, what I treat as
the first maxim is a combination of Huber’s first two, and my second maxim
corresponds to Huber’s third. See STORY, supra note 49, § 17.
217. STORY, supra note 49, § 18; see also id. § 7 (“[A country’s law’s] can
bind only its own subjects, and others, who are within its jurisdictional limits;
and the latter only, while they remain therein.”).
218. See id. § 9.
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state affect and bind directly all property . . . within its territory . . . and all persons who are resident within it,” and “no
state . . . can, by its laws, directly affect or bind property out of
219
its own territory, or bind persons not resident therein.” Call
this Story’s anti-extraterritorialism maxim. Because states’
regulatory powers were strictly limited by their physical territorial borders, Story’s approach is typically referred to as the
“territorialist” approach to choice-of-law.
Story’s second maxim invoked Huber once again. Notwithstanding the anti-extraterritorialism axiom, the courts of state
A may, and generally will, as a matter of “comity,” give “force”
to the laws of state B insofar as state B’s laws are applied to
220
property, persons and events within state B’s borders. For instance, an English court typically will give force to a contract
entered into in France pursuant to French laws. Comity is necessary because “nothing could be more inconvenient in the
commerce and general intercourse of nations, than that what is
valid by the laws of one place should become without effect by
221
the diversity of laws of another . . . .” But comity is a matter
of the forum’s discretion, not a legal requirement. Accordingly,
other states’ laws need not be given force if they are “contrary
222
to [the forum’s] known policy, or prejudicial to its interests.”
These maxims meant that choice-of-law for Story comprised two parts. First were the rules for physically locating
persons, things, and occurrences; location was crucial to determining which sovereign’s law applied on account of the antiextraterritorialism axiom. Second were the rules concerning
223
comity.
b. Application to Milliken, and Modern Territorialism
Let us now turn to the Milliken court’s decision. Under the
first maxim, determining whether Massachusetts or Maine law
applied turned on where some crucial event had occurred. Looking to caselaw and quoting Story’s treatise, the court concluded
that because “capacity of the contracting party” concerned the

219. Id. §§ 18, 20. For a qualification, see infra note 249 and accompanying
text.
220. See STORY, supra note 49, §§ 29, 38.
221. Id. § 29.
222. Id. § 38.
223. Story was skeptical that comity could be reduced to clear cut rules. See
id. § 28. The bulk of his treatise accordingly was directed to localizing rules.
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224

“validity of a contract,” capacity was to be determined by the
225
226
place of contracting. Since the contract was made in Maine,
that state’s capacity rules governed, so the guaranty contract
was valid. On to the second maxim: since “it is only by the comity of other states that laws can operate beyond the limit of the
state that makes them,” the Massachusetts court then considered whether it should decline to give effect to the contract on
227
grounds of “public policy.” Milliken gave force to Maine’s law,
228
upholding the validity of Mrs. Pratt’s contract.
Joseph Beale carried Story’s territorialist approach forward into the twentieth century. Like Story’s first maxim,
Beale’s treatise assumed “[i]t is quite obvious that since the only law that can be applicable in a state is the law of that state,
229
no law of a foreign state can have there the force of law.” Determining physical location accordingly was critical to Beale (as
it was to Story), and Beale (like Story) concluded that “[t]he
question whether a contract is valid” was to be determined by
230
the law of the “place of contracting.” Beale brought this approach to the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, which provided
that “[t]he law of the place of contracting determines the validity and effect of a promise with respect to . . . capacity to make
231
the contract.” But Beale rejected Story’s second maxim. Dispensing with comity, Beale believed that “[w]hen a right has
been created by law, this [vested] right itself becomes a fact”
232
that “cannot be called into question anywhere.”
Beale’s Restatement is universally referred to today as the
First Restatement because the American Law Institute adopted
224. Id. § 102b. Milliken quoted a different part of Story’s discussion that
was not as clear as what I have reproduced above.
225. See Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, 381 (1877) (quoting Story’s
treatise that “capacity of persons to contract” determined by “lex loci
contractus”).
226. The place of contracting was decided by the forum law, and
Massachusetts at the time had not adopted the mailbox rule, but instead
viewed acceptance as occurring upon the offeror’s physical receipt of offeree’s
acceptance. See id. at 376 (noting that the guarantee was executed in
Massachusetts and mailed in Massachusetts, but that “[t]he contract between
the defendant and the plaintiffs was complete when the guarantee had been
received and acted on by them at Portland, and not before”).
227. Id. at 382–83.
228. See id.
229. BEALE, supra note 46, § 5.4.
230. Joseph Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 HARV.
L. REV. 260, 270–71 (1910).
231. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934).
232. BEALE, supra note 46, § 73.
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a second restatement of conflicts sixty-seven years later (what
today is known as the Second Restatement of Conflicts). But
the First Restatement is not a relic; it still is relied upon by the
ten or so states that today utilize what is called the
233
A modern
“territorialist” approach to choice-of-law.
territorialist state thus would conclude, as did the 1878 Milli234
ken court, that Mrs. Pratt’s contract was valid.
2. Modern Alternatives and Four Lessons
Beginning in the early 1900s, the Legal Realist movement
235
propounded a sustained critique of the territorialist system,
showing that the apparently rule-bound system of territorial236
ism was indeterminate and laboring to identify the actual
considerations that informed courts’ choice-of-law determina237
tions. But notwithstanding the Realists’ critiques, most states
in the United States continued using the territorialist method238
ology well into the 1950s. Today’s heterogeneity of choice-oflaw methodologies, which I shall now describe, is thus a relatively new phenomenon.
The discussion that follows toggles back and forth between
two stories. The first is a demonstration of the multiple approaches to choice-of-law presently used by states. The second
narrative arc identifies four lessons that emerge from the critique of territorialism and territorialism’s alternatives that will
inform Part III’s argument that choice-of-law
be
reconceptualized as federal law. This subsection interweaves
233. See, e.g., Symeonides, supra note 2, at 255 (describing an Ohio court
resolving a conflict-of-law case).
234. Most modern territorialist states, however, reject Beale’s view that
vested rights categorically must be given effect, and instead allow the forum to
refuse to give effect to the foreign law (and whatever rights it may have
vested) through the public policy exception.
235. See infra note 250 and accompanying text.
236. For example, why not say that the legal question at issue in Milliken
was an aspect of family law capacity, which under territorialism is governed
by domicile, rather than the validity of contract, which under territorialism is
governed by the place of contract formation? In other words, there is
indeterminacy in which state’s law is selected under territorialism where (a) a
legal question is susceptible to two different characterizations (such as ‘family
law’ or ‘contract formation’) and (b) the two characterizations’ choice-of-law
rule select different states’ law.
237. See, e.g., LORENZEN, supra note 46 (differentiating between types of
considerations that informed court decisions about choice-of-law).
238. See Korn, supra note 205, at 820–22 (bringing the cases that “began to
pave the way for the first total and explicit break with the traditional
approach” in the choice-of-law rules concerning torts and conflicts).
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these two narratives because they are related; the lessons simultaneously emerge from, and deepen an understanding of,
each of territorialism’s alternatives.
a. First Lesson: The Repudiation of Anti-Extraterritorialism
It is important for present purposes to identify a conceptual cornerstone of Story’s and Beale’s territorialism that has
been widely repudiated: the anti-extraterritorialism maxim. As
I shall shortly explain, the territorialist methodology does not
239
depend upon the anti-extraterritorialism maxim. But recognizing the fallacy of anti-extraterritorialism will prove to be
important to this Article’s argument that choice-of-law is federal law, and is necessary to appreciate why territorialism is not
the only logical possibility.
i.

Description

For Story, the anti-extraterritorialism maxim was selfevident:
It is plain, that the laws of one country can have no intrinsic force,
proprio vigore, except within the territorial limits and jurisdiction of
that country. They can bind only its own subjects, and others, who are
within its jurisdictional limits; and the latter only, while they remain
therein . . . . Whatever extra-territorial force they are to have, is the
result, not of any original power to extend them abroad, but of that
respect, which from motives of public policy other nations are dis240
posed to yield to them . . . .

The anti-extraterritorialism maxim was embraced by im241
portant American jurists who preceded Story, by many state
242
courts thereafter, in late nineteenth-century Supreme Court
243
cases describing the scope of states’ powers, and by Joseph
244
Beale.
239. See infra note 263.
240. STORY, supra note 49, § 7.
241. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. (12 Tyng) 1, 3 (1816) (“That
the laws of any State cannot, by any inherent authority, be entitled to respect
extraterritorially, or beyond the jurisdiction of the State which enacts them, is
the necessary result of the independence of distinct sovereignties.”).
242. See, e.g., Ala. Great S. R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 134 (1892)
(holding that Alabama statute “had no efficacy beyond the lines of Alabama”
but “is to be interpreted in the light of universally recognized principles of
private, international, or interstate law” so that it does not “operate upon facts
occurring in another state”); Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, 383 (1877).
243. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877), overruled by
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (stating “every State possesses
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its
territory” and “no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
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Story’s anti-extraterritorialism maxim relied foremost on
245
Yet as Ernest
the Dutch treatise writer Ulrich Huber.
Lorenzen has shown, in “proclaiming in such unqualified terms
the territoriality of all laws, Huber went beyond any of his pre246
decessors.” French, German, and Italian scholars all recognized that “some laws were deemed to follow the person wher247
ever he went,” and accordingly had extraterritorial effect. In
fact, Story himself recognized this; Story discussed the civilians’ distinction between real and personal statutes, concluding
that “[w]henever [foreign jurists] wish to express, that the operation of a law is universal, they compendiously announce,
that it is a personal statute; and whenever, on the other hand,
they wish to express, that its operation is confined to the coun248
try of its origin, they simply declare it to be a real statute.”
Thus Story used “universal” to mean having effect outside a
state’s territorial borders, meaning that Story understood personal statutes to have extraterritorial effects. Story also
acknowledged another “exception, of some importance” to the
maxim: “that although the laws of a nation have no direct,
binding force, or effect, except upon persons within its own territories; yet that every nation has a right to bind its own sub249
jects by its own laws in every other place.” As Lorenzen
shows, Story’s treatise embraced other exceptions to the anti250
extraterritorialism maxim.

persons or property without its territory” in determining territorial limits on
state’s adjudicatory jurisdiction); Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594
(1881) (“No State can legislate except with reference to its own jurisdiction. . . .
Each State is independent of all the others in this particular.”).
244. See BEALE, supra note 46, § 4.12. Beale’s anti-extraterritorialism was
the product of his jurisprudence, which posited that the “very nature of law”
demanded that “law extend[s] over the whole territory subject to it and
appl[ies] to every act done there,” and that only one law can apply to any
single person, transaction or occurrence. See id. At one point in his treatise,
however, Beale “comes perilously close to recognizing overlapping legislative
jurisdiction.” Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our
Intelligence by Means of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821, 1884 n.205
(2005) [hereinafter Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi].
245. See STORY, supra note 49, §§ 29–38; LORENZEN, supra note 46, at 136
(“Story himself relied upon Huber more than upon any of the other foreign
jurists”).
246. LORENZEN, supra note 46, at 137.
247. See id.
248. See STORY, supra note 49, §§ 12–16, at 26–27 (emphasis added).
249. Id. § 21.
250. LORENZEN, supra note 46, at 3–9.
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While the many exceptions in his treatise may mean Story
intended to “express only [a] general attitude of the AngloAmerican law” rather than a categorical principle of territorial251
ity, nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Supreme Court
cases typically referred to the anti-extraterritoriality maxim as
if it were absolute. An 1892 decision declared, without qualification, that “[l]aws have no force of themselves beyond the ju252
risdiction of the State which enacts them,” and a 1914 case
stated “it would be impossible to permit the statutes of Missouri to operate beyond the jurisdiction of that State . . . without throwing down the constitutional barriers by which all the
States are restricted within the orbits of their lawful authori253
ty.” One commentator who has catalogued the Court’s “territorial limits . . . on the reach of state laws” vis-à-vis criminal
law, tax laws, and business regulations has concluded that
“[e]very significant attribute of legislative power available to
states was territorially circumscribed . . . by the late nineteenth
254
century as a matter of constitutional principle.”
But categorical anti-extraterritoriality never squared with
actual practice. From early on, states applied their laws to persons, transactions, and occurrences beyond their physical borders. For example, in 1819 Virginia’s General Court held that a
Virginia statute which criminalized “all felonies committed by
citizen against citizen, in any such place” authorized Virginia’s
prosecution of a Virginia citizen for having stolen a fellow Vir255
ginian’s horse in the District of Columbia. A nineteenthcentury Texas law provided that “[p]ersons out of the State
may commit, and be liable to indictment and conviction for
committing, any of the offenses enumerated in this chapter,
which do not in their commission necessarily require a personal
256
presence in this state.” Interpreting this law, an 1882 Texas
decision upheld the application of Texas’s criminal law to an
act of forgery of a land certificate for Texas property, though all
257
criminal acts had occurred in Louisiana.

251. See id. at 3 (identifying this possible interpretation of Story).
252. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892).
253. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914).
254. James Y. Stern, Choice of Law, the Constitution, and Lochner, 94 VA.
L. REV. 1509, 1516, 1519 (2008).
255. See Commonwealth v. Gaines, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 172, 174 (1819).
256. 1879 TEX. CRIM. STAT. 454.
257. Hanks v. State, 13 Tex. Ct. App. 289, 305–09 (1882).
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In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court formally recognized the power of states to regulate persons and things outside their physical borders. In Strassheim v. Daily, the Court
permitted Michigan to prosecute a non-Michigander for acts de258
frauding Michigan that were undertaken in Illinois. Writing
for the Court, Justice Holmes wrote “[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental
effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the
259
harm as if he had been present at the effect.” Speaking of
states’ civil jurisdiction, the Supreme Court observed in the
1930s that “the power of [one state] to effect legal consequences
by legislation is not limited strictly to occurrences within its
260
boundaries . . . .” Today’s restatements and model codes explicitly acknowledge that states have the power to apply their
261
laws extraterritorially.
Though this Article’s focus is on American law, choice-oflaw’s longstanding connection to private international law
makes it appropriate to observe that Huber’s strict antiextraterritorialism has not fared well in international law either. The Harvard Research Project famously identified five
traditional bases of jurisdiction over crimes under international
262
law, three of which justify extraterritorial regulation. These
258. 221 U.S. 280, 281 (1911). For a full discussion, see Rosen, supra note
5, at 864–76.
259. Strassheim, 221 U.S. at 285.
260. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 156 (1932),
overruled in part by Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965); Alaska
Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532, 538 (1935)
(applying California’s workmen’s compensation statute, which by its terms
applied to “injuries suffered without the territorial limits of this state,” to
work accidents occurring in Alaska); see also Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus.
Accident Comm’n of Cal., 306 U.S. 493, 498–500 (1939) (assuming that
Massachusetts’ workmen’s compensation law, which by its terms applied to
injuries received in course of employment “whether within or without the
commonwealth,” could constitutionally be applied to an accident occurring in
California).
261. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 402 reporters’ note 5 (1986) (stating that states within the
United States “may apply at least some laws to a person outside [State]
territory on the basis that he is a citizen, resident, or domiciliary of the
State”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(f ) (1962) (positing that State A may
impose liability if “the offense is based on a statute of this State that expressly
prohibits conduct outside the State”).
262. See H. R. I. L., Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT’L L.
SUP 435, 445 (1935) (describing regulatory jurisdiction justified on basis of the
“national” principle under which a country can regulate its own citizens
extraterritorially, the “protective” principle that allows a country to regulate
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conclusions have been broadly accepted as reflecting contemporary international norms, and the Third Restatement of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States adopts the research
project’s principles as the basis for American extraterritorial
263
regulatory jurisdiction.
ii. Implications of Anti-Extraterritorialism’s Repudiation
The repudiation of Story’s first maxim does not necessarily
entail the rejection of territorialism as a choice-of-law methodology. Territorialism’s rules may (or may not) be a useful method, all things considered, for purposes of choice-of-law. But anti-extraterritorialism’s repudiation means that territorialism
cannot be defended as the sole legitimate choice-of-law methodology on the basis of deductive logic from principles of sovereignty or territoriality. To explain, Story’s first maxim entailed
a territorialist choice-of-law methodology that aimed to identify
where something had occurred because anti-extraterritorialism
meant that only the polity where the event transpired had the
power to regulate it. But a location-based choice-of-law methodology is no longer the only possibility in a world of extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction, in which the polity where an
event did not occur also may have the power to regulate it. Repudiating the anti-extraterritorialism maxim accordingly opens
264
the door to other choice-of-law methodologies.
There is a second respect in which the first maxim’s rejection
profoundly
alters
choice-of-law.
Under
antiextraterritorialism, choice-of-law was a method for determining
what single polity’s law applied to a given person, transaction,
or occurrence. Only one law could apply—the law of the polity
where the event transpired—and the task of choice-of-law was
to identify which polity that was. Anti-extraterritorialism’s repudiation, by contrast, entails the possibility that two (or more)
polities might have the power to regulate a given person,
transaction, or occurrence. In the words of the modern Supreme
Court, “a set of facts giving rise to a lawsuit, or a particular is-

extraterritorially when its national interest is harmed, and the “passive
personal” principle where a country can regulate non-citizens’ extraterritorial
acts that harm their citizens extraterritorially).
263. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 402.
264. For these reasons, I reject Professor Laycock’s argument that choiceof-law rules must be territorial.
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sue within a lawsuit, may justify, in constitutional terms, ap265
plication of the law of more than one jurisdiction.”
This means two or more polities might have concurrent
regulatory authority, and each polity may have different regulations. In such a circumstance, a genuine choice among conflicting laws may have to be made. After all, notwithstanding
Story’s and Beale’s nomenclature of “conflicts of law,” the maxim of anti-extraterritorialism in effect denied the possibility of
conflict among jurisdictions’ regulations, and hence of any need
to choose which polity’s law applied. Put simply, the possibility
of conflict—and the resulting need to exercise choice—arises
only if states have concurrent regulatory authority.
Choosing among different polities’ conflicting laws is more
conceptually complex than determining where something occurred. Indeed, as explained further below, choosing among different polities’ conflicting laws is an enterprise that is inherently and unavoidably subjective—and in that sense deeply
266
political. Though the alternatives to territorialism have been
largely
silent
about
their
connection
to
antiextraterritorialism’s repudiation, we shall see that they all presuppose the possibility of concurrent regulatory authority, and
hence all reject anti-extraterritorialism. Their recognition that
two or more states may have concurrent regulatory powers is
the reason why most methodological alternatives to territorial267
ism incorporate substantial subjective components.
b. Modern Alternatives to Territorialism
Let us now explore how five alternatives to territorialism
would analyze Milliken: Interest Analysis, the Second Restatement, Significant Contacts, Better Law, and Lex Fori.
i.

Interest Analysis

We know how an interest analysis state would approach
Milliken because Brainerd Currie, the scholar who developed
interest analysis, provided an enormously influential critique of
268
Milliken.
The first question an interest analysis court asks is what
(if any) state’s law would be applicable to Mrs. Milliken’s poten265. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981).
266. See infra note 287.
267. With the one exception of lex fori.
268. See Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflictof-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958).
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tial contract. This determination is made by means of ordinary
legal analysis: by interpreting statutory language and analyzing case law. Since state law almost never explicitly indicates
whether or not it is to apply to circumstances that straddle
multiple states, courts applying interest analysis typically must
appeal to the purposes behind a given law. If interpretation of
both states’ legal materials reveals that only one state’s law
applies, then there is a “false conflict,” and the court can only
apply the one state’s law that is applicable. If analysis indicates
that more than one state law is applicable, then there is a “real
269
conflict.” (What to do with such real conflicts will be addressed shortly).
It is worth noting that the category of real conflicts is inconsistent with the anti-extraterritorialism maxim. Under the
maxim, only one state’s law determines the validity of a contract—the place where the contract was made. Because Massachusetts law rejected the mailbox rule in Milliken’s day, and
instead deemed a contract to form at the place of acceptance
(Maine), only Maine’s law possibly could apply. Real conflicts,
in other words, are an artifact of concurrent regulatory jurisdiction.
Currie proposed that the purpose of Massachusetts’s law
disallowing married women’s contracts was to “protect [] mar270
ried women.” Continues Currie in a famous passage: “What
married women? Why, those with whose welfare Massachusetts
271
is concerned, of course—i.e., Massachusetts married women.”
On this view, Massachusetts’s law, under which married women were without the capacity to contract, indeed applied to Mrs.
Pratt. Currie thought the policy behind Maine contract law was
to protect the security of its residents’ contracts, and hence that
272
Maine’s law applied to protect citizen Milliken. The Milliken
case thus presents a “real conflict.”
Currie thought courts lacked the institutional capacity to
resolve real conflicts, and that Congress instead should resolve
them pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s Effects

269. There is a third possibility under interest analysis: that no state’s law
applies, what has been dubbed an “unprovided-for case.” I discuss this third
case in greater detail below. See infra notes 342–51.
270. Currie, supra note 268, at 239.
271. Id. at 234.
272. See id.
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273

Clause. In the absence of federal statute, Currie concluded
that when faced with a real conflict, the forum should simply
274
apply forum law. Some scholars have tried to develop a prin275
cipled defense of Currie’s rule. A state fully following Currie’s
approach accordingly would have applied the law of Massachusetts, thereby finding against Mr. Milliken.
276
Some interest analysis states (most notably California)
have rejected Currie’s solution to real conflicts, and instead apply a “comparative impairment” analysis. Comparative impairment requires a court to apply the law of the state whose
interests would be most gravely impaired if its law were not
applied, thereby minimizing overall costs. On Milliken’s facts,
this would mean comparing the costs to Massachusetts of not
protecting married women (if Massachusetts law were not applied) as against the costs to Maine of not protecting the security of its citizens’ contracts (if Maine law were not applied). The
outcome almost always will be indeterminate, for reasons soon
277
to be explained.
ii. The Second Restatement
Since twenty-three states have adopted the Second Re278
statement for choice-of-law questions concerning contracts, let
us now see how Milliken would be analyzed under that approach to choice-of-law. The Second Restatement provides that
“[i]ssues in contract are determined by the law chosen by the
279
parties” or, if none has been chosen, “by the local law of the
state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant
relationship to the transaction . . . under” a laundry list of
280
“principles” that are found in section 6. The section 6 principles include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested

273. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 124–
25 (1963); infra Part III.B (demonstrating Congress’s powers to enact choiceof-law rules for both state and federal courts).
274. Id. at 119.
275. See Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53 (1991).
276. See Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 723–25 (Cal. 1976).
277. See infra notes 310–20.
278. Symeonides, supra note 2, at 279.
279. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 186 (1971). The
Restatement provides two caveats regarding the parties’ ability to choose the
governing law. See id. § 187(2).
280. Id. § 188(1).
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states and the relative interests of those states in the determination
of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e)
the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty,
predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determina281
tion and application of the law to be applied.

The Restatement further specifies that “in applying the
principles of Section 6, a court is to “take[] into account” the
“place of contracting,” “the place of negotiation of the contract,”
“the place of performance,” “the location of the subject matter of
the contract,” and “the domicil, residence, nationality, place of
282
incorporation and place of business of the parties.” Finally,
“[t]hese contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative
283
importance with respect to the particular issue.”
The Second Restatement is notoriously indeterminate.
Enumerating what seems to be all conceivably relevant considerations, it provides no guidance when different factors point to
the application of different states’ laws. Because Mrs. Pratt’s
guaranty contract contained no choice-of-law provision, the
question under the Second Restatement would be which state
284
“has the most significant relationship” to the contract, as determined by the Section 6 principles. Principles (b) and (c)—
”the relevant policies of the forum” and “other interested
285
states” —call for interest analysis, and so would generate a
real conflict. Principle (c) further specifies that a court should
consider “the relative interests of those states in the determina286
tion of the particular issue,” inviting a comparative impairment analysis, which is indeterminate for reasons soon to be
287
288
explained. The “protection of justified expectations” (principle (d)) would favor Maine law on the theory that the parties
289
are presumed to have intended to create valid contracts.
290
“Certainty, predictability and uniformity of result” could be
argued either way.
Second Restatement courts typically do not consider all of
Section 6’s principles, and a frequently overlooked considera281. Id. § 6.
282. Id. § 188(2).
283. Id.
284. Id. § 188(1).
285. Id. § 6.
286. Id. (emphasis added).
287. See infra notes 310–20.
288. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
289. Cf. Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 137–38 (1882) (holding that
parties are presumed to have intended to create a valid contract).
290. Id.
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tion is principle (a)’s “needs of the interstate . . . system[].” If
it were applied, principle (a) might favor application of Maine
law, which arguably facilitates interstate commerce. Principle
292
(e), the “basic policies underlying the particular field of law,”
would favor Maine law to the extent the “basic policy” underlying contract law is facilitating transactions, though principle (e)
also could be argued to favor Massachusetts law insofar as contract law paternalistically protects persons.
iii. Significant Contacts
Five states use a “significant contacts” and/or “center-ofgravity” test for resolving choice-of-law questions regarding
293
contracts, which is akin to the Second Restatement “most significant relationship” test but without the section 6 principles.
This test requires the court to identify all relevant contacts
that the parties had with each state and select the state with
the greatest number and importance of contacts. This test is
indeterminate for three main reasons. First, the number of contacts is a function of how each contact is characterized, and
multiple characterizations are possible. For instance, is there a
single Maine contact described by Mrs. Pratt’s guaranty contract with Milliken, or should each of Mr. Milliken’s actions in
Maine regarding the guaranty contract (for instance concerning
its negotiation, its receipt, his acting upon it) count as a separate contact? Second, there is uncertainty as to whether all contacts count, or only those that are (deemed to be) relevant to
the choice-of-law decision at hand. For example, do any, or all,
of Mr. Pratt’s contacts with Massachusetts and Maine in relation to the sales contract count for purposes of determining
which state’s law applies to determine the validity of the guaranty contract? Third, most courts that utilize the significant
contacts test do not claim to decide simply based on which state
has the largest number of contacts. This means they assess the
relative weight of the different contacts, a self-evidently openended inquiry. The center-of-gravity test is intended to be more
intuition-based than significant contacts, but in practice it too
tends to look to contacts.

291. Gary J. Simson, Choice of Law After the Currie Revolution: What Role
for the Needs of the Interstate and International Systems?, 63 MERCER L. REV.
715, 724 (2012).
292. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6.
293. Symeonides, supra note 2, at 279.
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As applied to the facts of Milliken, the significant contacts
and center-of-gravity tests are indeterminate, for the reasons
mentioned above. Massachusetts law may be selected on the
basis that the Pratts at all times were there, and Mrs. Pratt’s
guaranty contract was in aid of a delivery of goods to Massachusetts. On the other hand, Maine also had many contacts:
Mr. Milliken at all times was there, the guaranty contract was
accepted and hence became a contract there, and Mr. Milliken
acted upon both the goods and guaranty contracts in Maine.
iv. Better Law
Two states use what is known as the “better law” approach, based on the work of the late Dean Robert A. Leflar, for
294
resolving choice-of-law questions concerning contracts. Leflar
claimed to identify “five major choice-influencing considerations, within which all or most of the factors that ordinarily af295
fect choice-of-law decisions can be incorporated”: (1) predictability of results, (2) maintenance of the interstate and
international order, (3) simplification of the judicial task, (4)
advancement of the forum’s governmental interests, and (5)
application of the better rule of law. Leflar purported to strip
296
away the “manipulative devices to cover up” that led courts to
decide as they did, and to forthrightly describe the factors that
297
courts actually take into account.
As to the first factor, Leflar wrote that “[u]niformity of results, regardless of forum, has always been a major goal in
298
choice-of-law theory.” Leflar explained the third factor to
299
mean that courts “use their own procedural rules.” Leflar’s
understanding of the remaining factors in effect rendered his
system a variant of interest analysis. Leflar explained the second factor as meaning that “[n]o forum whose concern with a
set of facts is negligible should claim priority for its law over
the law of a state which has a clearly superior concern with the
300
facts . . . .” This reduced the second factor to interest analy294. Id.
295. Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing
Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584, 1585–87 (1966).
296. Id. at 1588.
297. Id. at 1585–86.
298. Id. at 1586.
299. Id. at 1587.
300. Id. at 1586. Further, “nor should any state’s choice-of-law system be
based upon deliberate across-the-board ‘forum preference.’” Id. This is a
rejection of the system known as lex fori, under which the forum simply
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sis’s insight regarding “‘false conflicts,”: a court first should determine if more than one state’s law applies and, if not, should
301
apply the single applicable law. Leflar’s fourth and fifth factors largely address real conflicts: the fourth factor favors forum law so long as it “has a genuine concern with the facts in a
302
given case” —what in effect justifies Currie’s rule that forum
law applies where there is a real conflict—and the fifth factor
provides that courts appropriately may choose the substantive
303
law they objectively believe to be the best.
As applied to Milliken, Leflar’s approach would permit the
Massachusetts court to resolve the real conflict in either of two
ways: choosing the law it thought to be best (either Massachusetts because it protected a class of people needing protection,
or Maine’s because the Massachusetts law was archaic or otherwise unwise), or applying Massachusetts law because the forum had a genuine concern with the case.
v. Lex fori
Some states apply a choice-of-law rule of lex fori, under
which forum law applies so long as the forum has any signifi304
cant contact. Lex fori presently is applied by only two states
305
in respect only to torts, though it has been endorsed by many
scholars as the presumptive rule that should apply to contracts
306
as well. Scholars supportive of this approach typically view
lex fori as a strong, though not absolute, presumption to be
overridden “only in such distinctive problem areas where a
transnationally [and country-wide] uniform pattern of
applies forum law. A few modern states have adopted lex fori vis-à-vis tort
law. Symeonides, supra note 2, at 279.
301. As I explain below, this reflects an incomplete understanding of what
is required by facilitating the interstate system.
302. Leflar, supra note 295, at 1587.
303. Id. at 1588.
304. See, e.g., Saleba v. Schrand, 300 S.W.3d 177, 181 n.2, 182 (Ky. 2009)
(holding that, absent a “special reason”, the law of the forum state, Kentucky,
should apply regarding torts).
305. Symeonides, supra note 2, at 279.
306. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori – Basic Rule in the Conflict of
Laws, 58 MICH. L. REV. 637, 679 (1960); Amos Shapira, “Grasp All, Lose All”:
On Restraints and Moderation in the Reformulation of Choice of Law Policy,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 248, 256–57 (1977). Prominent contemporary endorsers
include Dean Simson, see Simson, supra note 291, at 726–27, and perhaps
Louise Weinberg, see Weinberg, supra note 275, at 65–67, 87–94 (proposing
forum law-solution to real conflicts using rationale that arguably supports lex
fori more generally).
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307

decisionmaking is patently indicated.” A lex fori approach in
Milliken would have led to the application of Massachusetts
308
law.
c. Second Lesson: The Heterogeneity of the Modern Approaches
The second lesson from the modern period is straightforward: there is a multitude of approaches to choice-of-law that
the states presently employ. As illustrated by our exercise with
Milliken, both analysis and outcomes vary depending upon the
choice-of-law methodology.
d. Third Lesson: The Existence and Intractability of Real
Conflicts
The third lesson from the modern approaches is that there
can be real conflicts, and that such conflicts are intractable. All
alternatives to classical territorialism recognize—consistent
309
with contemporary Supreme Court doctrine —that states can
have concurrent regulatory jurisdiction, and that more than
one state’s substantively divergent laws can apply to a particu310
lar person, transaction, or occurrence. When two or more
such laws apply we have a real conflict—something that was
conceptually
impossible
under
territorialism’s
antiextraterritoriality axioms, under which only one state’s law
311
could govern a single transaction or occurrence. Sixty years of
case law and intense scholarly thought have failed to uncover a
312
satisfactory judicial solution to real conflicts. Currie’s proposal that forum law should be applied is administratively
simple but normatively unsatisfactory, for it impairs prelitigation predictability as to governing law, results in inconsistent outcomes, and encourages forum shopping. Leflar’s better law approach likewise undermines pre-litigation predictability, generates inconsistent results, and suffers from the
307. Shapira, supra note 306, at 265–69.
308. The uncertainty is generated by the fact that scholars supportive of lex
fori have recognized the need for an exception to protect justified expectations.
See id. at 265–66.
309. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313–20 (1981) (holding
that Minnesota state law could apply to a tort that occurred outside the state).
310. This is true of the scholarly forms of lex fori that recognize lex fori to
be a strong, but rebuttable, presumption. See, e.g., Shapira, supra note 306, at
265–69.
311. See supra Part II.B.1.
312. See Mark D. Rosen, Should “Un-American” Foreign Judgments Be
Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783, 819 n.179 (2004).
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added drawback of vesting judges with decisionmaking authority—choosing what they think to be the best law—that is not
properly theirs in a democracy.
The most conceptually promising approach to resolving real conflicts is comparative impairment. Comparative impairment posits that real conflicts should be resolved by means of a
decision rule that minimizes the costs of non-application of the
313
two states’ laws. In other words, a court should apply the law
of the state whose interests would be most impaired were its
law not applied. Though such a decisionmaking rule seems
314
wise, it is exceedingly difficult for a single court to implement. After all, how are the costs of non-application to be
measured and compared? Each state’s law typically reflects diverging judgments as to facts, and as to how incommensurable
commitments are to be harmonized. When state laws are a result of these sorts of differences, comparative impairment cannot generate determinate answers.
To illustrate, consider Milliken once again. Massachusetts
valued security of contracts, but thought it more important to
protect married women. Maine either thought married women
did not need special protection (i.e., had a different assessment
of facts), or thought it more important to uphold contracts (i.e.,
had a different values assessment). If the difference between
the two states’ laws reflected differing assessments of facts,
how is a court applying comparative impairment to generate a
determinate answer? The answer is simple: it cannot. Comparative impairment is similarly indeterminate if the two states
agreed as to facts but differed as to commitments. Protecting
married women and securing contracts are both commitments,

313. See generally Baxter, supra note 17 (discussing rationale behind
comparative impairment). There is a vast literature on comparative
impairment. In addition to Baxter’s article, the most important analyses
include William H. Allen & Erin A. O’Hara, Second Generation Law and
Economics of Conflict of Laws: Baxter’s Comparative Impairment and Beyond,
51 STAN. L. REV. 1011, 1034–37 (1999); Leo Kanowitz, Comparative
Impairment and Better Law: Grand Illusions in the Conflict of Laws, 30
HASTINGS. L.J. 255 (1978); Herma Hill Kay, The Use of Comparative
Impairment To Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California
Experience, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 576 (1980); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 316–18 (1990).
314. Though one might ask why the states would not instead select a rule
that sought to maximize the benefits of applying state law. The results of
Comparative Impairment and (what might be called) “Comparative
Betterment” conceivably could diverge, and why is the former decisional rule
preferable to the latter?
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but they are what philosophers call “incommensurable”: it is
not possible to translate both of them to a meaningful common
metric such that an objective comparison can be made between
them. Making decisions between or among incommensurable
commitments accordingly is an exercise of subjective choice rather than cold logic. Indeed, such choices define and express,
and in that sense are deeply constitutive of, the
315
decisionmaker’s character; an individual’s choice among competing incommensurable commitments goes far to determining
316
who she is as a person, and a state’s decision among competing incommensurable commitments is a core determinant of its
political culture.
There is no “view from nowhere” from which a single insti317
tution can undertake a comparative impairment analysis. Accordingly, comparative impairment clarifies why real conflicts
present intractable dilemmas, but does not provide courts tools
to generate determinate solutions. Fortunately, as I have explained in detail elsewhere, legislators can undertake comparative impairment by negotiating solutions to real conflicts before
318
they occur. The bad news concerning real conflicts, accordingly, is not that they cannot be managed, but just that courts
cannot manage them well.
Another approach to managing real conflicts is to let citizens choose the law themselves through contractual choice-of319
law provisions. Such a “party autonomy” approach doesn’t
contradict the argument above that real conflicts are conceptually intractable; it eliminates the conflict rather than resolving
it. But party autonomy has limitations. First, it is an option only where parties have an ex ante relationship, and hence is
315. See Elijah Millgram, Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning, in
INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth
Chang ed.) 151, 151–69 (focusing on individual decision making under
circumstances of incommensurability); Joseph Raz, Incommensurability and
Agency, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON,
supra, at 110, 127 (arguing that choice, not rationality, governs the selection
among incommensurables); Charles Taylor, Leading a Life, in
INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra, at
178–83 (arguing that justified choice among incomparables can be made by
analyzing how the competing goods fit within the “shape” of a person’s life).
316. See Taylor, supra note 315.
317. But cf. THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (addressing the
problem of how to combine subjective and objective viewpoints).
318. See Rosen, Congress’s Primary Role, supra note 170, at 21–25.
319. Advocates of this approach do not believe it to be limited to resolving
real conflicts.
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available for only a subset of choice-of-law questions. Further,
party autonomy is normatively suspect where one of the contracting parties is a repeat player with superior information
and resources to the other contracting party, for party autonomy allows the repeat-player to systematically choose the sub320
stantive law that benefits it. This can have undesirable distributive consequences, and also may undermine paternalistic
321
law and laws that protect third-party interests.
e. Fourth Lesson: Fading of Interstate Considerations
The final lesson to draw from our survey of alternatives to
territorialism is that contemporary choice-of-law approaches do
not take much account of the health of the interstate system.
We can readily hypothesize how this has come to pass: the most
influential alternative to territorialism, Currie’s governmental
interest approach, focuses exclusively on states—ascertaining
the state “interests” behind the different states’ laws—and lit322
erally takes no account of the interstate system. Leflar’s second factor is “maintenance of the interstate . . . order,” but he
(and cases following him) treated this as being interchangeable
323
with the charge that courts should be aware of false conflicts.
The Second Restatement’s section six principles include “the

320. See, e.g., HERMA H. KAY, LARRY KRAMER & KERMIT ROOSEVELT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 115–16 (9th ed. 2013) (detailing plan of Citicorp, a New
York holding company, to undertake steps so South Dakota usury law, which
allows charges of up to twenty-four percent interest, would apply to consumer
credit card contracts).
321. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971)
(explaining that the parties’ choice of law is disregarded if “application of the
law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state
which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the
determination of the particular issue”). A considerable body of case law refuses
to enforce choice-of-law provisions on the ground that the chosen law
contravenes public policy. See Symeonides, supra note 2, at 247–52 (discussing
recent cases concerning enforceability of choice-of-law and choice-of-forum
provisions).
322. See Simson, supra note 306, at 722 (“[I]nterest analysis leaves little
room for courts to consider policies other than those reflected in states’
domestic laws . . . .”); Trautman, Toward Federalizing, supra note 14, at 1721–
22.
323. See Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 157 (1973) (“[N]o more is called
for than that the court apply the law of no state which does not have
substantial connection with the total facts and the particular issue being
litigated.”); Leflar, supra note 295, at 1587 (“No forum whose concern with a
set of facts is negligible should claim priority for its law over the law of a state
which has a clearly superior concern with the facts.”).
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needs of the interstate and international systems,” but this
also has not received much attention from courts or commenta325
tors. As Dean Simson has observed, “in practice, the needs of
the interstate and international systems have figured only
marginally in courts’ decisions on choice of law. Even on the rare occasions that the needs are mentioned in the courts’ opinions, they often play no meaningful role in the final resolu326
tion.”
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING CHOICE-OF-LAW AS
FEDERAL LAW
Building on the insights from Parts I and II, this Part presents this Article’s core claim: that in a post-Erie positivist
world in which law must be traceable to some sovereign, domestic choice-of-law rules must be federal law. Section A explains why, on functional and conceptual grounds, choice-of-law
must be federal law. Section B fortifies Section A’s argument on
positive grounds, showing that the Constitution gives Congress
the power to prescribe uniform choice-of-law rules that would
be applicable in both state and federal courts. Section C argues
that the 1948 amendments to the Full Faith and Credit Act
partially overruled Klaxon, and that Klaxon should be fully
overturned to revive language in the Rules of Decision Act that
authorizes federal courts to create federal choice-of-law rules.
Section D explains that even without these two federal statutes, choice-of-law would best be understood as a nationwide,
uniform body of federal common law.
A. WHY CHOICE-OF-LAW IS FEDERAL LAW
For functional and conceptual reasons, domestic choice-of327
law is best understood as being federal law. First, as Subsec324. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(a) (1971).
325. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, On the Need for a Uniform Choice of Law
Code, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2134, 2141 (1991) (arguing “we must think about
choice of law more like treaty negotiations, where the ‘correctness’ of a
particular solution is simply a matter of what the states agree to do,” thus
overlooking systemic considerations).
326. Simson, supra note 306, at 749; Luther L. McDougal III, Toward the
Increased Use of Interstate and International Policies in Choice-of-Law
Analysis in Tort Cases Under the Second Restatement and Leflar’s ChoiceInfluencing Considerations, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2465, 2466–69 (1996).
327. See Hart, supra note 18, at 514 (concluding that questions addressed
by conflict of laws are “essentially federal, in the sense that they involve, by
hypothesis, more than one state.”); Trautman, Toward Federalizing, supra
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tion 1 explains, choice-of-law can only discharge its function of
managing the differences of substantive law across polities if
there is a single uniform set of choice-of-law rules across those
polities—what this Article has been calling the Single System
Requirement. Interestingly, all three pre-modern conceptualizations of choice-of-law surveyed in Part I—choice-of-law as
general law, as Bealean common law, and as constitutional
law—satisfied the Single System Requirement. In a post-Erie
world, federal law holds out the only prospect for satisfying the
Single System Requirement. Subsections 2 through 4 argue
that, as a conceptual matter, federal law is the appropriate apparatus for policing the limits of states’ extraterritorial powers,
determining the nature of our federal union, and maintaining
the health of the interstate and federal systems.
1. An Historical and Functional Argument for the Single
System Requirement
a. The Single System Requirement, and the Unyielding Need
for Uniform Results
As Part I showed, choice-of-law historically has functioned
as a system for managing substantive differences of law across
polities to facilitate cross-polity transactions; it was originally
developed in Europe to serve this goal, and was imported into
this country to do the same. Choice-of-law can effectively manage the differences in substantive law across polities only if
choice-of-law generates uniform outcomes across those polities.
That is to say, the chosen law—the law deemed applicable to a
person, transaction, or occurrence that straddles multiple polities—cannot vary depending upon which polity’s court is asked
to determine which law applies. If choice-of-law does not generate uniform results, then it will not be predictable as to which
polity’s law applies.
The absence of predictability is deeply problematic, for
predictability is necessary for both people and polities: predictability allows parties to rationally plan their activities with the
knowledge of what law applies, and thereby enables the regulating polity’s laws to be efficacious. To elaborate, without predictability, there will be pre-litigation uncertainty, or mistake,
note 14 (“I have no doubt that choice of law as between states of the United
States is, in theory, inherently and unarguably a federal question.”); see also
Gottesman, supra note 16, at 32 (arguing that choice-of-law is a “uniquely
appropriate federal role”).
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as to which state’s law applies. People will be unable to conform
their actions to legal requirements, or to intelligently bargain
in the shadow of the law. Such legal uncertainty also undermines states’ capacity to effectively regulate, to the extent that
328
compliance requires knowledge as to what law governs. Furthermore, if the need for litigation should arise, heterogeneous
choice-of-law regimes and their attendant non-uniformities will
encourage forum shopping, and may impose unnecessary litigation costs—for instance, fighting as to which choice-of-law rules
apply, and efforts to transfer forum so as to trigger a choice-oflaw system that will select the favored substantive law. For all
these reasons, if a choice-of-law system does not generate uniform results, choice-of-law cannot successfully accomplish its
managerial functions.
Choice-of-law can generate uniform results, and hence allow for predictability as to applicable law, only if one condition
holds: if all the polities whose differences in substantive law occasion the need for choice-of-law use the same choice-of-law
329
rules. This is what gives rise to what I have been calling
choice-of-law’s ‘Single System Requirement.’ Predictability is
lost if the Single System Requirement is not met. If two polities
use different choice-of-law rules—such that state A’s choice-oflaw rules select state Z’s contract law whereas state B’s choiceof-law rules select state Y’s—then parties cannot predict what
law will govern, and choice-of-law will fail as a management
system.

328. Compliance sometimes is possible even under conditions of
uncertainty as to which state’s law governs. For example, if one state’s law is
stricter than another’s with respect to only a single dimension, it is possible to
comply with both state’s laws. But compliance with the stricter law may in
some circumstances be in tension with the less strict state’s law. For example,
if the less strict state’s policy is to permit persons to be unregulated where its
restrictions are inapplicable, then compliance with the stricter state’s law due
to uncertainty as to which state’s law applies must be deemed to undermine
the policy of the less-strict state.
329. See Hart, supra note 18, at 514 (“[U]niformity of obligation as between
particular individuals, regardless of the locus of litigation, is almost invariably
desirable; and the essence of this can be achieved without enacting uniform
substantive laws. The promotion of this kind of uniformity . . . is one of the
functions of the principles of the conflict of laws.”).
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b. The Single System Requirement As a Solution to Renvoi
i.

The Problem of Renvoi

An additional consideration demonstrates that choice-oflaw has a Single System Requirement. The Single System Requirement eliminates what is widely described as the most con330
ceptually intractable problem in choice-of-law, renvoi.
Demonstrating this necessitates full discussion of the intricate
subject of renvoi. Readers who are not already familiar with
renvoi may wish to jump ahead ten pages to Part III.A.1(c);
while the analysis of renvoi below strengthens the case for the
Single System Requirement, the less technical considerations
discussed thereafter fully ground this Article’s argument that
choice-of-law is inherently federal.
To explain renvoi, let us slightly rework the facts of the
331
well-known case of In re Schneider’s Estate. Consider a domiciliary of State A who, at his death, has real property in State
B. Assume that the decedent’s will is valid under State A’s law,
but not State B’s. Assume further that State A’s choice-of-law
rule provides that the law of the place where the real property
is located governs the will’s validity as regards that property
(the situs rule), whereas State B’s choice-of-law rule is that a
will’s validity is governed by the law of the testator’s domicile
(the domicile rule).
Note what will occur if a lawsuit concerning the will’s validity as applied to the real property is litigated in the court of
State A. Applying State A’s choice-of-law rule, Court A will determine that the question of the will’s validity should be determined by the law of State B. But when Court A goes to apply
the law of State B, it must consider what to do about State B’s
choice-of-law rule, which provides that the will’s validity should
be governed by State A’s law. There are only two options, neither of which is palatable.
330. For an extensive list of scholars who identify renvoi as intractable, see
Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi, supra note 244, at 1822–24. For thorough
discussions of the many unsuccessful solutions to renvoi that have been
propounded by American scholars, see Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 984–97 (1991). Most recently, proponents of interest
analysis thought their approach eliminated the problem of renvoi, but Larry
Kramer and Kermit Roosevelt have persuasively debunked that claim. See id.
at 997–1012; Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi, supra, note 244, at 1850–64. I
discuss Professor Roosevelt’s intriguing proposed solution to renvoi below. See
infra Part III.A.1.b.iii.
331. 96 N.Y.S.2d 652 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950).
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First, Court A can apply State B’s choice-of-law rule—in
the arcane language of choice-of-law, Court A can ‘accept the
renvoi.’ But doing so will generate an infinite loop, for State A’s
choice-of-law, it should be recalled, determines that State B’s
law applies (which in turn determines that State A’s law applies, which in turn determines that State B’s law applies, ad
332
infinitum). The infinite loop can be eliminated if, after accepting the renvoi from State B, Court A disregards its own choiceof-law rule (rejects the renvoi) and applies only its ‘internal
law’ concerning testamentary validity. But what justification
can there be for accepting the renvoi once and once only—that
is to say, for State A to apply choice-of-law rules twice (first the
choice-of-law of its own state and then State B’s domiciliary
rule), and thereafter to ignore choice-of-law rules? To this day,
333
there is no widely accepted answer to this question.
The second option is that after Court A applies its choiceof-law rule—which, to recall, indicates that State B’s law governs the will’s validity—Court A can ignore State B’s choice-oflaw rule (‘reject the renvoi’) and straightaway apply State B’s
testamentary rules to the will (apply only State B’s ‘internal
law’, not its ‘whole law,’ in the language of renvoi). Rejecting
the renvoi avoids the risk of an infinite loop, but what is the
justification for Court A’s decision to apply only its state’s
choice-of-law rule? No widely accepted answer to this question
334
has yet been identified.
ii. Solving Renvoi by Banishing It: The Single System
Requirement
This Article solves renvoi by eliminating it: renvoi arises
only if different states have different choice-of-law rules, and
this Article’s core claim is that there must be a single federal
choice-of-law system operative in both state and federal
335
courts. Put differently, the paradox of renvoi is additional ev332. Renvoi also arises if State B’s choice-of-law rules would select the
substantive law of State C. For present purposes we need not explore this even
more complicated scenario, which only amplifies the point made above in the
text.
333. See CURRIE ET AL., supra note 125, at 64–70; supra note 330.
334. See id.
335. Professor Roosevelt has stated that “eliminat[ing] the possibility of
renvoi . . . requires complete uniformity in choice-of-law methodology, internal
law, and characterization techniques—at which point, obviously, there is very
little need for choice of law.” See Resolving Renvoi, supra, note 244, at 1830.
While Roosevelt is right to dismiss as impossible such a trifecta uniformity, see
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idence for the Single System Requirement. Satisfying the Single System Requirement—ensuring that there is a single
choice-of-law system over the jurisdictions whose differences in
substantive law choice-of-law manages—is the only way to
avoid the paradox of renvoi.
My renvoi-avoiding argument on behalf of the Single System Requirement would be weakened, though not fatally undermined, if there were a satisfactory alternative solution to
renvoi. Such an alternative would weaken my argument on behalf of the Single System Requirement because renvoi would no
longer be a veritable paradox; a solution’s ability to sidestep an
unsolvable paradox constitutes strong evidence that the solu336
tion contains a conceptual advance. In separate articles, Professors Larry Kramer and Kermit Roosevelt each have demonstrated the insufficiencies of the proposed solutions to renvoi
337
that were advanced in the twentieth century. I find their
analyses persuasive, and accordingly incorporate their arguments by reference.
Accompanying Professor Roosevelt’s review of the unsatisfactory past solutions, however, is an ingenious novel solution
338
to renvoi. The strength of my claim on behalf of the Single
id. (“Renvoi . . . is aptly termed one of the ‘pervasive problems’ in choice of
law.” (citations omitted)), he overstates the uniformity necessary to eliminate
renvoi. Uniformity as to internal law and characterization techniques is
necessary only within a territorialist approach to choice-of-law, for only
territorialism relies on characterization and internal law to locate where a
transaction or occurrence has taken place. Though this Article is not the place
to fully work out the details of federal choice-of-law, this much can be said: the
fact that territorialism demands uniformity of substantial swaths of
substantive law to achieve uniformity of choice-of-law results is a strong
reason for rejecting territorialism as a candidate insofar as one of choice-oflaw’s core tasks is to generate uniform results that permit ex ante
predictability. I provide a few more general observations concerning the
specifics of federal choice-of-law below. See infra notes 474–77.
336. Even the existence of a remedy for renvoi would not necessarily
destroy my claim that the Single System Requirement’s circumvention of
renvoi constitutes strong evidence in its favor. Whether the existence of a
solution in fact rendered the Single System Requirement’s avoidance of renvoi
normatively irrelevant would turn on a detailed analysis of the solution’s
strengths and weaknesses. For example, a ‘solution’ that created problems, or
that was based on counterfactual assumptions, would do little to undermine
the strength of an approach that obviated the problem. Moreover, the
existence of even a fully satisfactory solution to renvoi would not necessarily
undermine this Article’s argument for the Single System Requirement,
becauseavoiding a problem altogether still might be normatively preferable.
Further, some problems have multiple good solutions.
337. See Kramer, supra note 330; Roosevelt, supra note 330.
338. See Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi, supra, note 244.
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System Requirement’s elimination of renvoi accordingly de339
pends in part on whether Roosevelt’s solution is satisfactory.
For the reasons explained below, I believe Roosevelt’s solution
to be brilliant but deeply problematic. It thus does not deflate
the power of the Single System Requirement’s elimination of
renvoi.
iii. Professor Roosevelt’s Proposed Solution to Renvoi
Roosevelt argues that where the choice-of-law rules of two
states each determine that the other state’s substantive law
applies—as in the variation on In re Schneider’s Estate discussed above—the solution is that no state’s substantive law
applies. Roosevelt’s solution, in other words, draws upon, and
expands, the component of interest analysis known as the
“unprovided-for” case. In Roosevelt’s words, “renvoi is simply a
340
special instance of the unprovided-for case.”
To appreciate Roosevelt’s argument, it is important to
quickly explain the notion of the unprovided-for case. The first
step of interest analysis is to determine whether each state’s
341
law would apply to the multistate set of facts. “False conflicts” are present where only one state’s law applies, whereas
“true conflicts” are where two (or more) states’ laws apply. But
there is a third possibility: that no state’s law applies. And that
is the unprovided-for case. As I shall now explain, though the
unprovided-for case is a perfectly valid concept, Roosevelt’s invocation of it as a solution to renvoi is problematic, and ultimately unworkable.
A concrete example will aid our analysis, so let us consider
342
the classic case of Erwin v. Thomas. After Mr. Erwin was injured by Mr. Thomas in Washington, Erwin’s wife sued Thomas
343
in Oregon for loss of consortium. Oregon law permitted such
claims, whereas Washington did not allow wives to sue for loss
344
of consortium. Applying interest analysis, the Oregon court
determined that Washington law would not apply to these
facts; the court thought the purpose of the Washington law was
to protect Washington defendants from having to pay for loss of

339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

But see supra note 336.
See Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi, supra, note 244, at 1885.
See supra notes 268–70.
506 P.2d 494 (Or. 1973).
Id. at 494–95.
Id. at 495.

ROSEN_5fmt

2/3/2015 10:09 AM

1082

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:1017

345

consortium, and there was no Washington defendant on the
346
case’s facts. The court also concluded that Oregon law was
inapplicable; the court thought Oregon law aimed to compen347
sate Oregon wives, and there was no Oregon wife in the case.
Although several scholars have argued that the possibility
of the category of an unprovided-for case proves that interest
348
analysis is conceptually unsound, Professor Larry Kramer
persuasively argues that an unprovided-for case on facts like
Erwin is simply an unproblematic instance where “[t]he plaintiff has no cause of action . . . because she suffered no legally
349
The appropriate response to an
cognizable injury.”
unprovided-for case of this sort is simply to dismiss for failure
to state a claim on which relief can be granted—a pedestrian
occurrence that in no way undermines interest analysis’s con350
ceptual coherence.
Though Professor Kramer’s explanation of the unprovidedfor case is to my mind irrefutably sound, Professor Roosevelt’s
reliance on unprovided-for cases to resolve renvoi does not
work, for four reasons. Accordingly, the Single System Requirement’s circumvention of renvoi remains a robust argument on the requirement’s behalf.
First, Roosevelt’s approach generates more gaps in the law
than good sense suggests exist. For example, Roosevelt’s approach leads to the conclusion that no state’s law governs the
validity of domiciliary A’s will in In re Schneider’s Estate. Consider as well the question in Milliken regarding the validity of
Mrs. Pratt’s guaranty contract: because Massachusetts choiceof-law indicated that Maine law applies, and Maine’s choice-of345. Professor Kramer persuasively critiques this interpretation of
Washington law. See Larry Kramer, The Myth of the “Unprovided-For” Case,
75 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1062 (1989).
346. 506 P.2d at 496.
347. Id.
348. See Kramer, supra note 345, at 1046 (citing arguments to this effect
propounded by Professor Aaron Twerski, Dean John Hart Ely, and Professor
Lea Brilmayer).
349. Id. at 1062. Professor Kramer ultimately concludes that the privileges
and immunities clause would obligate Oregon to apply Oregon law and that
Erwin v. Thomas therefore is not really an unprovided-for case. See id. at
1073. I do not agree with that component of Kramer’s argument, though this
already lengthy Article is not the place to explain why; this Article’s argument
on behalf of the Single System Requirement does not at all depend upon the
conceptual soundness of unprovided-for cases.
350. Professor Roosevelt agrees. See Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi, supra,
note 244, at 1885 (endorsing Kramer’s solution).
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law rule would have selected Massachusetts contract law (on
the assumption the mailbox rule was operative in Maine, so
that any contract would have come into existence in Massachusetts, where Mr. Pratt mailed the contract), Roosevelt would
conclude that no law governed the validity of Mrs. Pratt’s contract. Yet the conclusion that no law governed either of these
situations seems unsound. Lawmakers and citizens likely
would expect that some law governed the will’s validity, and the
validity of Mrs. Pratt’s contract. Let us call the absence of law
in each of these cases, under Professor Roosevelt’s approach, a
“Surprising Gap.”
The category of a Surprising Gap does not entail a rejection
of unprovided-for cases. Tools that Professor Roosevelt has
helped publicize enable us to see why. Roosevelt helpfully suggests that choice-of-law analysis consists of two steps: (1) identifying the ‘scope’ of each state’s law to determine what kind of
case there is (for instance a false or true conflict) and, if there is
a true conflict, (2) applying a “rule of priority” to determine
351
“which of the conflicting rights will prevail.” It makes perfect
sense to invoke the category of the unprovided-for case when
analysis at the first step determines that a multistate circumstance falls outside the scope of both states’ laws; that is what
happened, for instance, in the above-discussed case of Erwin v.
Thomas. The category of a ‘Surprising Gap’ hence sheds no
doubt on the validity of unprovided-for cases.
Professor Roosevelt’s tools also help us to see, however,
why his proposed solution to renvoi creates veritable Surprising
Gaps. It makes no sense to conclude that there is an
unprovided-for case where analysis of the scope of each state’s
laws determines that both would apply, and renvoi results only
because each state uses a different “rule of priority.” Calling
such a circumstance an unprovided-for case is, in fact, perverse;
rather than being unprovided-for, the circumstance is overprovided-for, in the sense that multiple states’ laws are prima facie
applicable. We confront renvoi—each state’s choice-of-law rule
selects a different state’s substantive law—only because the
states disagree as to which state’s law should prevail in that
circumstance of both states’ substantive laws being prima facie
applicable. Frequently, a state’s decision to forego applying its
own law, and to instead apply another state’s law, reflects that
state’s commitment to comity (its desire to be accommodating of

351. Id. at 1871.
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352

the other state). Surely a circumstance where each state
would like to apply its own law, but out of comity would apply
the other’s, is not appropriately described as an unprovided-for
case where neither state’s law applies, as Professor Roosevelt
would have us do.
Second, under Roosevelt’s approach, Surprising Gaps in
substantive law vis-à-vis transborder occurrences will increase
to the extent that states’ choice-of-law rules diverge. This is so
because the more that states’ choice-of-law rules diverge, the
greater is the likelihood that states’ choice-of-law rules will
identify different state law as being applicable. Yet there is no
justifiable basis for thinking that increasing divergences in
choice-of-law should escalate the number of unprovided-for cases. This is an additional consideration that suggests Roosevelt’s
solution is conceptually off-the-mark.
To his credit, Roosevelt acknowledges that his solution “is
in a certain sense the death of choice of law”—that it is an
“abandonment of the fundamental aspiration of the field of con353
flict of laws” that “will surely strike some as shocking.” But
Roosevelt does not come to terms with the breadth of the gaps
in law that his approach produces, nor with the fact that the
number of gaps likely will increase should states’ choice-of-law
regimes continue to diverge. Roosevelt’s solution depends upon
the existence of Substantial Gaps not heretofore recognized,
and it likely would increase those gaps if states’ choice-of-law
systems continue to diverge. These concerns must count as arguments against his solution—particularly if there is an alternative solution to renvoi (namely, the Single System Requirement) that does not generate Surprising Gaps.
Third, there is no simple, normatively justifiable way that
the forum’s legislature, or its courts,can fill the Surprising
Gaps that appear under Roosevelt’s proposed solution. A Surprising Gap appears where two conditions obtain: (1) Forum A’s
choice-of-law rule determines that State B’s law applies and (2)
State B’s choice-of-law rule determines that Forum A’s law applies. Call this ‘the two-factor circumstance.’ The only way Forum A’s legislature (or courts) can fill that Surprising Gap is by
prescribing a substantive law that will apply in the two-factor
circumstance. Any such solution will be quite odd; plugging the
gaps requires the forum to have, first, a conditional choice-of352. Cf. Kramer, supra note 345, at 1052.
353. Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi, supra, note 244, at 1888 (citations
omitted).
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law rule under which another state’s law governs unless that
state’s choice-of-law indicates that the forum’s substantive law
applies, and also, second, a substantive rule that will apply in
that circumstance. That’s pretty strange.
And the problems of legislative remedying of Rooseveltian
gaps go beyond strangeness. What substantive law should the
forum prescribe? There are only two possibilities, and both are
problematic. First, Legislature (or court) A could create a
unique substantive rule that would govern should the twofactor circumstance pertain. Second, Legislature (or court) A
could provide that Forum A’s substantive law incorporates B’s
354
substantive law.
The first solution creates a troubling asymmetry: the identical set of facts that straddle more than one state sometimes
will result in the application of another state’s substantive law,
and other times in the application of A’s substantive law, and
which obtains will depend entirely on the foreign state’s choice355
of-law rules. The second solution is functionally equivalent to
a court’s rejecting the renvoi insofar as it in effect disregards
the foreign state’s choice-of-law rule—a practice that is functionally identical to rejecting the renvoi, which to this day has
356
not been successfully justified.
Furthermore, both solutions are prone to generating nonuniformity of results across state courts, thereby undermining
predictability and incentivizing forum shopping. To illustrate,
imagine that both the forum and foreign states adopt the first
solution—that is to say, each adopts a unique rule (A1 and B1) to
354. The second solution is equivalent to the legal realists’ “local law”
approach to resolving renvoi. See Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi, supra, note 244,
at 1842–43.
355. It might be thought that there is a valid counter-argument: there is no
troubling asymmetry because a set of facts Y that straddles States A and B is
not identical to the same set of facts Y that straddles States A and C if C has
different law than B. The counter-argument is generally valid vis-à-vis
substantive laws; if B and C have different tort rules, then there is a
meaningful difference between facts Y that straddle A and B, on the one hand,
and facts Y that straddle A and C. But there is an important question that
must be resolved to determine whether the counter-argument is valid as
applied here—is the counter-argument valid vis-à-vis states’ different choiceof-law rules? Answering this question would appear to replay the question
that lies at the heart of renvoi, as to whether the non-forum’s choice-of-law is
deemed to be law that must be applied by the forum, and for that reason is
likely intractable. And that is why the statement above in text, to which this
footnote is attached, remains valid.
356. For a thorough critique of this solution, see Roosevelt, Resolving
Renvoi, supra, note 244, at 1843–49.
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be applicable in the event the two-factor circumstance arises. If
P files suit in court A, then rule A1 will apply, whereas rule B1
will apply if the lawsuit is filed in court B. Non-uniformity of
results will also occur if both states adopt the second solution: if
P files suit in court A, then rule B will apply, whereas rule A
will apply if the lawsuit is filed in court B. Uniform results will
obtain only if one of two events occur: (1) the unlikely event
that all state legislatures determine that the identical substantive rule R is to apply when the two-factor circumstance arises,
or (2) the fortuitous circumstance where one of the two states
giving rise to the two-factor circumstance has adopted the first
solution and the other has adopted the second. Surely uniform
results should not hinge on unlikely events or mere fortuity.
Fourth, Roosevelt’s solution is undesirable because it continues the contemporary approach of treating conflicts as state
357
law. The core of Roosevelt’s argument is that whether foreign
law applies can only be determined by the foreign state because
applicability of the foreign state’s law is exclusively a question
358
of state law. This assumption is deeply problematic: for the
reasons explained already in this Part III.A.1, along with those
to come in Part III.A.2, choice-of-law is best understood as be359
ing federal law.
In conclusion, this Article’s federal choice-of-law approach
satisfies the Single System Requirement and thereby solves
renvoi, but without the untoward consequences of Roosevelt’s

357. See id. at 1888.
358. See id. (concluding that renvoi is the byproduct of the mistaken notion
that “forum law can determine the scope of foreign law,” a proposition that “is
an unconstitutional usurpation of authority, a denial of the basic proposition
that a state’s courts have the last word on the meaning of their own law”).
359. To be more precise, determining when a state’s law applies to an
occurrence that straddles multiple states is primarily a function of federal law.
Fully explaining why this determination is primarily, not exclusively, a
function of federal law is complicated, and the subject of a work-in-progress. A
brief preview of that article’s argument nonetheless may be useful here.
Whether a foreign law prima facie applies to a multi-state circumstance turns
on the scope of state law, which is a matter of state law. Much of the time,
however, more than one states’ laws will be applicable to a multistate
circumstance; put differently, there are far fewer false conflicts than interest
analysis ordinarily purports to identify. This means that choice-of-law’s
frequently will have to determine which of two or more prima facie applicable
states’ laws will be applied, and that is a matter of federal rather than a state
law. All state courts (as well as federal courts) have the power to aim to
answer this federal question of which of two prima facie applicable state laws
should be applied, and such resolutions ultimately are subject to Supreme
Court review and congressional revision.
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approach. By satisfying the Single System Requirement, the
federal law approach eliminates the very source of renvoi. And
it resolves renvoi in a manner that is consistent with deeply
held and longstanding intuitions. Thus, under the federal approach, there is law that addresses the validity of A’s will in In
re Schneider’s Estate, and of Mrs. Pratt’s contract in Milliken.
Renvoi’s infinite loop is avoided because there is a single body
of choice-of-law rules, applicable in both states’ courts (and federal courts as well), that selects one state’s substantive law to
govern these validity questions. Whereas under Roosevelt’s approach “choice-of-law rules cannot resolve the very question
360
that called them into being,” under this Article’s federal approach choice-of-law can discharge the tasks that called it into
being.
To be sure, renvoi still can arise under this Article’s approach for so long as neither Congress nor the courts have definitively identified a nationwide choice-of-law rule. But any
such renvoi risks are contingent, not an inherent property of a
federal approach to choice-of-law. Only the federal approach to
choice-of-law, which meets the Single System Requirement, is
capable of eliminating renvoi.
c. Longstanding Historical Practice, the Single System
Requirement, and Federal Law
The analysis above shows there was wisdom in the
longstanding historical practice, shown in Part I, of conceptualizing choice-of-law as a type of law that, by its nature, was everywhere uniform. All three pre-modern conceptualizations of
choice-of-law surveyed in Part I—choice-of-law as general law,
as Bealean common law, and as constitutional law—
accordingly satisfied the Single System Requirement. The relatively recent contemporary phenomenon of multiple choice-oflaw systems violates the Single System Requirement, and for
that reason is fundamentally incompatible with what choice-oflaw aims to accomplish. Put simply, a multiplicity of choice-oflaw systems is itself a conceptual oxymoron.
In our contemporary post-Erie country, federal law holds
out the best hope of satisfying the Single System Requirement
by delivering the nationwide uniformity that domestic choice361
of-law requires. Consider state law’s inherent deficiencies.
360. Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi, supra, note 244, at 1888.
361. See Freund, supra note 185, at 1211 (“Uniformity can be achieved
most naturally by the adoption of uniform rules of conflict of laws.”).
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Klaxon’s conception of choice-of-law—under which choice-of-law
is state law that is expected to vary across states—is literally
antithetical to uniformity. Though state law is not necessarily
incompatible with uniformity—there could be a uniform choiceof-law statute formulated by the Uniform Law Commission and
362
adopted by all state legislatures —state law poses many practical barriers to uniformity. Not every state may agree to enact
the ‘uniform’ law. Even those legislatures that do may make
changes to the uniform legislation, creating non-uniformities in
statutory language. Finally, even where there is identical statutory language, non-uniformities almost invariably will be introduced by the supreme courts of each state, each of which has
363
final interpretive authority over its state’s law.
Federal law sidesteps all these impediments to uniformity.
Whereas each state holds a veto power under a uniform laws
364
approach, the federal legislative process can generate a nationwide uniform choice-of-law statute upon receiving simple
majorities in Congress with presidential support. The ability to
generate binding rules absent unanimity is important where
coordinating rules are necessary because unanimity require365
Supreme Court review
ments undersupply valuable law.
likewise holds out the possibility of nationwide uniform interpretation of the statute, or of federal common law doctrines for
choice-of-law.
2. Why Choice-of-Law Is Inherently Federal: Three
Conceptual Arguments
The previous subsection looked to history to locate a feature—consistency with the Single System Requirement—that
was shared by multiple conceptualizations of choice-of-law, and
then argued that choice-of-law is today best understood as federal law on account of contemporary jurisprudential commitments having nothing to do with choice-of-law—namely our
post-Erie positivist need to tie law to some sovereign. The previous subsection then bolstered the argument on behalf of the

362. For such a call, see Kramer, supra note 325.
363. See generally DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 233
(1965) (noting these things).
364. I explain below Congress’s sources of power to enact nationwide
uniform choice-of-law statutes.
365. See DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL
FRAMEWORK 243–45 (2008). See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS
OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT SMALL 73–176 (2007).
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Single System Requirement by showing that it can solve the
paradox of renvoi.
This subsection argues that choice-of-law is appropriately
understood as federal because it accomplishes three inherently
366
federal functions : it polices states’ extraterritorial powers, is
substantially responsible for determining the nature of our federal union, and maintains the health of the interstate system.
These three tasks are inherently federal because they are not of
interest to only a single state, they cannot properly or effectively be decided by single states, and they are best decided by the
federal government on functional and normative grounds.
a. Policing States’ Extraterritorial Powers
First, choice-of-law discharges the inherently federal func367
tion of policing the scope of states’ extraterritorial powers.
Treating choice-of-law as state law is to allow each state to determine for itself whether its or another state’s law is to govern
a person, transaction, or occurrence that both states have constitutional power to, and wish to, regulate. Consider the Harrah’s Club case, where California residents who had been
served excessive alcohol in a Nevada tavern later had a car ac368
cident in California while returning home. California law allowed recovery against the Nevada tavern keeper for injuries
suffered in California that had been proximately caused by his
369
sale of alcohol in Nevada, whereas Nevada law did not. Both
states had power, consistent with the Constitution, to apply
their laws. Under the modern view that choice-of-law is state
366. In so doing, this subsection does not confine itself to history, but
suggests that choice-of-law is best understood, as a conceptual matter, as
federal law—not as general law or Bealean common law.
367. Choice-of-law acts in conjunction with other doctrines, including
federal limitations on states’ extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction, to
discharge this role. See Rosen, supra note 5, at 871–913. For other arguments
that choice-of-law discharges an inherently federal function, see Baxter, supra
note 17, at 22–23 (“[T]he process of resolving choice cases is necessarily one of
allocating spheres of legal control among states . . . . Responsibility for
allocating spheres of legal control among member states of a federal system
cannot sensibly be placed elsewhere than with the federal government.”).
Unlike the argument presented here, Baxter did not think Congress had the
power to prescribe choice-of-law rules for states. See id. at 42 (arguing that
that “every state should, as a matter of state law, adopt the comparative
impairment principle; but I cannot justify a federal compulsion to do so.”). For
my response to Baxter, which identifies and explains the source of such
congressional power, see infra notes 382–88.
368. Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 720 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
369. Id. at 721.
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law, the California court was able to decide as a matter of state
370
law whether to apply California or Nevada law. As argued
371
above, real conflicts like Harrah’s Club are intractable —they
are not susceptible to determinate, principled resolution, but
instead are necessarily decided through a process of indeterminate factual and political prognostication, and then by rendering inherently subjective tradeoffs among those courtdetermined factual and policy differences that are incorporated
in the two states’ laws. With this understanding, it is not too
surprising that the California court in Harrah’s Club chose to
apply California law, and it seems likely that a Nevada court
372
would have chosen otherwise. What is surprising is that the
law determining which state’s law applied presently is deemed
to be state law.
Modern political theory is rightfully suspicious of claims
that bureaucracies can be trusted to determine the scope of
their own powers. And when the competing state laws reflect
deep differences in the values of each respective state, allowing
each to choose for itself is tantamount to asking the proverbial
fox to guard the henhouse. These problems are not sidestepped
by the fact that courts are the typical decisionmakers; most
state judges are elected, and even those that are appointed can
be expected to share their state’s political preferences insofar
as they are appointed by the state’s politicians. Making matters
worse, state legislatures have the ultimate power to set choice373
of-law rules under most modern choice-of-law methodologies.
In short, the modern understanding that states possess extraterritorial regulatory authority that generates real conflicts
constitutes another reason why the law that sorts out such conflicts—choice-of-law—must be federal, not state.
b. Helping To Determine the Character of our Federal Union
Choice-of-law plays a significant role in determining the
very character of the federal system. Allowing room for legal
pluralism is one well-recognized benefit of federalism; federalism allows states to take different regulatory approaches vis-àvis policies concerning which neither the Constitution nor fed370. See id. at 722.
371. See supra Part II.B.2.d.
372. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d at 725–26.
373. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 6(1) (1971)
(“A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive
of its own state on choice of law.”).
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374

eral law demand national uniformity. On the other hand, our
federal system also values allowing citizens of each state to
have an opportunity to travel to sister states where, in addition
to taking in the scenery, they can have access to the laws of
those sister states. These two values—legal pluralism and what
might be called legal tourism—frequently can come into conflict. For instance, State A’s more restrictive laws designed to
paternalistically protect its citizens or protect the interests of
third parties (say, State A’s limitations on gambling) will be
undermined to the extent that a citizen A from State A can
simply cross the border and be subject to State B’s progambling laws. What is true of gambling laws is equally true of
a host of deeply controversial laws about which states take divergent regulatory approaches: for instance parental notifica375
tion statutes and motorcycle helmet laws.
This Article is not the place to seek to resolve the difficult
normative question of how to harmonize these competing val376
ues of legal pluralism and legal tourism. What is relevant for
present purposes are two related points. First, how the competing values are harmonized is a substantial determinant of the
character of our federal system. Second, in today’s jurisprudential world where states have substantial overlapping regulatory
jurisdiction—such that both the domiciliary state and the tourism state typically have power to regulate citizen A consistently
with the due process clause—choice-of-law is the main tool for
reconciling the competing values of legal pluralism and legal
tourism. For instance, choice-of-law would determine whether
citizen A, while she is in state B, will be subject to state A’s anti-gambling laws or state B’s allowance to gamble.
The upshot is this: to the extent that choice-of-law determines how the competing values of legal pluralism and legal
tourism are to be balanced, choice-of-law is determining the
character of our federal union, and hence properly has the status of federal rather than state law.

374. See generally Mark D. Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?: Positive,
Normative, and Institutional Considerations of States’ Extraterritorial Powers,
51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 713, 744–50 (2007).
375. See generally Rosen, supra note 5, at 882–91.
376. See generally Rosen, supra note 374 (fleshing out these competing
considerations more fully).
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c. Maintaining the Health of the Interstate System
Third, choice-of-law ensures that the interstate system is
377
well-functioning. Predictability as to what state’s law will apply to a multi-state transaction or occurrence—which, as discussed above, requires satisfaction of the Single System Requirement—is only one way choice-of-law affects the interstate
system’s health. Choice-of-law doctrines also can help reduce
transaction costs—both contracting and litigation costs—
associated with interstate activity. Further, choice-of-law has
effects on interstate frictions. For instance, a choice-of-law rule
that permits a forum not to apply non-forum law may open the
door to the widespread circumvention and hence undermining
378
of non-forum law —something that can produce interstate
friction.
More generally, because determining the character of our
federal system and maintaining the interstate system’s health
are inherently federal matters, it follows that choice-of-law also
is appropriately federal since it is so deeply interwoven with
both. Post-Klaxon empirical evidence substantiates this conceptual claim: choice-of-law has largely ignored interstate and fed379
eral considerations since it has been viewed as state law.
Moreover, although federal interests in theory could be managed by the states, as through the uniform law process, this
seems to be a second-best solution. Leaving management of
federal interests to the states is an approach reflecting not the
spirit of our Constitution but that of the Articles of Confedera380
tion. Instead, federal interests are best guarded by federal officials, who are charged with protecting federal matters. State
officials typically—and properly—are concerned with state interests.

377. Indeed, the Second Restatement goes so far as to say that “[p]robably
the most important function of choice-of-law rules is to make the interstate
and international systems work well.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS, § 6 cmt. d.
378. See generally Rosen, supra note 5, at 864–76.
379. Cf. CAVERS, supra note 363, at 220 (noting the federal system need
not respect state lines).
380. See generally Jack N. Rakove, The Collapse of the Articles of
Confederation, in THE AMERICAN FOUNDING: ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION 225–45 (J. Jackson Barlow, Leonard W. Levy & Ken
Masugi, eds., 1988) (noting the widely accepted understanding that the
Articles of Confederation problematically left too much power to the states to
govern matters concerning the nation as a whole).
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B. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO PRESCRIBE CHOICE-OF-LAW
The above arguments concerning the federal character of
choice-of-law are bolstered by the Constitution’s allowance for
the federalization of choice-of-law. Let us first consider Congress’s power to prescribe uniform federal choice-of-law rules
that would be applicable in state courts before considering
choice-of-law in the federal courts.
Congress’s power vis-à-vis state courts comes from the Full
Faith and Credit’s Effects Clause. The Clause’s first sentence
declares that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts . . . of every other State,” and the second provides that “Congress may by general Laws prescribe
the Manner in which such [public] Acts, Records and Proceed381
ings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” The Constitution’s drafting history demonstrates that “public Acts” included
state legislation, and that Congress’s powers to prescribe the
382
“Effects thereof” encompassed “public Acts.” Early congresses
believed their powers extended to prescribing the effects of
383
state records and judgments, and the Court has consistently
381. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).
382. For the definitive early argument to this effect, see Cook, supra note 1,
at 425–26, 433–34 (“[T]he language of the clause was intended by its framers
to give Congress the power ‘by general laws’ to ‘prescribe the effect,” i.e., the
legal effects or consequences, in other states of the ‘public acts, records and
judicial proceedings’ of a state—including, therefore, legislative acts as well as
judgments and all other records and judicial proceedings,” and that “Congress
could by enacting such a statute substitute, at least to a large extent, a code of
uniform national law.”). An early version of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
only granted Congress power to prescribe “the effect which judgments
obtained in one State shall have in another.” Id. at 425 (emphasis omitted).
Gouverneur Morris thought this too narrow, and proposed an amendment
essentially identical to the constitutional language that ultimately was
adopted. See id. Commenting on Morris’ changes, Doctor Johnson “thought
that the amendment, as worded, would authorize the General Legislature to
declare the effect of the Legislative acts of one State in another State,” and no
one is recorded as disagreeing. Id.; see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 484–85 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). See generally CAVERS,
supra note 363, at 246, 249 (noting that the Effects Clause “has dangled a
tantalizing alternative before scholars who have brooded over the difficulties
of developing a satisfactory system of judge-made rules to govern choice of law
by the states of the Union,” though ultimately concluding that legislative
solutions to choice-of-law present a “limited, but by no means unimportant,
opportunity”); Gottesman, supra note 16, at 23 (“Scholars are virtually
unanimous in their view that Congress has the power to enact federal choice of
law statutes.”); Sachs, supra note 15, at 1227–29.
383. See Sachs, supra note 15, at 1240–78. But see id. at 1273 (noting one
congressman who “idiosyncratically” argued that Congress only had the power
to prescribe authentication procedures, not effects).
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explained that the Effects Clause gives Congress power to de384
termine the “extra-state effect of [state] statutes.” Though the
Framers did not understand “public Acts” to include state
385
common law, there are powerful arguments for concluding
that the Effects Clause should be understood to encompass
386
common law after Erie, and “[t]here is a categorical statement by the Supreme Court of the United States that common
law is within the protection of the [Full Faith and Credit]
387
clause.”
384. Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 502
(1939) (speaking of “the case of [state] statutes, the extra-state effect of which
Congress has not prescribed, as it may under the constitutional provision”); see
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 728–29 (1988) (deciding that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause did not preclude a forum state from applying its
statute of limitations to all claims in a nationwide class action on the ground
that it was “procedural,” but also noting that at “[i]f current conditions render
it desirable that forum States no longer treat a particular issue as procedural
for conflict of laws purposes . . . it can be proposed that Congress legislate to
that effect under the second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”).
385. Cook, supra note 1, at 434 n.27a (concluding for that reason that
“Congress has power to prescribe the effect of state statutes only, and not that
of state ‘common law.’”).
386. As Elliott Cheatham has argued, “[i]t would be a serious breach in our
constitutional system if the protection given in interstate matters were wholly
dependent on the formal nature of the state law involved—statute or common
law.” Cheatham, Federal Control, supra note 17, at 602. Michael Gottesman
has persuasively argued that insofar as Erie ruled that “[s]tate laws resulting
from judicial enunciation of ‘common law’ are for federal constitutional or
statutory purposes indistinguishable from state laws adopted by the
legislature . . . . it would be wholly anomalous to construe the Full Faith and
Credit Clause as distinguishing between state judicial and legislative
lawmaking” for purposes of the Effects Clause. Gottesman, supra note 16, at
27. Support for this conclusion comes from the recent decision of Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental
Protection, where Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion concluded that the Takings
Clause applies to state court changes in common law, though the Framers
would not have thought so since they believed “courts had no power to ‘change’
the common law.” 560 U.S. 702, 727 (2010). “Where the text they adopted is
clear,” said Justice Scalia, “what counts is not what they envisioned but what
they wrote.” Id. The Full Faith and Credit Clause likewise could be said to
have “clear” text that encompasses common law within the phrase “Judicial
proceedings,” see Gottesman, supra note 16, at 26 (noting Justice Jackson’s
view), “records,” see id. (noting Harold Crosskey’s suggestion), or “public
[A]cts,” see Cheatham, Federal Control, supra note 17, at 602.
387. Cheatham, Federal Control, supra note 386, at 603 n.77 (citing to
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 436 (1943), which referred to
“the faith and credit . . . to which local common and statutory law is entitled
under [th]e Constitution and laws of the United States” (emphasis supplied by
Cheatham)). A four-Justice plurality voted to overrule Magnolia, though on
different grounds, in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261
(1980).
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Let us now proceed to choice-of-law in the federal courts.
The need to apply choice-of-law rules vis-à-vis competing state
laws arises in federal courts when they exercise either diversity
388
Eminent scholars long have
or supplemental jurisdiction.
thought that the Diversity Clause includes the power to generate choice-of-law rules to decide the cases that are before the
389
federal court. A recent edition of Hart and Wechsler’s Federal
Courts concludes that “Congress, acting under its power to
make laws ‘necessary and proper’ to the exercise of jurisdiction
under Article III, could certainly enact, or authorize the formu390
lation of, federal choice-of-law rules for the federal courts.”
Such congressional authority would apply to federal courts’ exercise of both diversity and supplemental jurisdiction, and is
independent of Congress’s powers under the Effects Clause to
prescribe choice-of-law rules for state courts.
C. INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The conclusion that Congress has the power as a matter of
positive law to enact choice-of-law rules for both federal and
388. To be clear, we are concerned only with circumstances where a federal
court must choose between the substantive law of two (or more) sister states—
not choice-of-law between federal and state law, which is addressed by
preemption doctrine and the Supremacy Clause.
389. Drawing heavily on a seminal article by Henry Friendly, the American
Law Institute concluded that “one of the purposes sought to be achieved by the
creation of the diversity jurisdiction might well have been the application of
choice-of-law rules different from, or at least independent of, those of the state
courts.” AM. L. INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 446 (1969) (citing Henry J. Friendly, The
Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 496 (1928)); see
also Baxter, supra note 17, at 37–39. For reasons that by now should be clear,
I take issue with the ALI’s suggestion that the federal choice-of-law rules
might be “different from” those of state courts; choice-of-law must be uniform
across federal and state courts. AM. L. INST., supra, at 446. That federal courts
would have a power “independent of” states to determine choice-of-law, id.,
may seem inconsistent with Part I’s claim, supra, that choice-of-law was
understood to be an aspect of general law, AM. L. INST., supra, at 446. It is not,
because diversity jurisdiction addressed concerns that state courts might not
be trustworthy. See Friendly, supra (“[T]here was much reason to fear that the
courts of a state having laws favorable to debtors would apply these laws in
favor of their own residents even though the debt was payable in another
state.”); Baxter, supra note 17, at 37.
390. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 565 (6th ed. 2009). It should be noted that Hart
and Wechsler’s Federal Courts’s conclusions as to congressional power to
“formulate” choice-of-law rules may be in tension with the ALI’s suggestion
that the federal judicial power, like all judicial power, includes “the power to
formulate choice-of-law rules.” AM. L. INST., supra note 389, at 444.
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state courts is sensible from the perspective of comparative in391
stitutional analysis. As Professor Roosevelt has helpfully explained, choice-of-law consists of two components: (1) determining the scope of two (or more) states’ laws for the purpose of
ascertaining whether there is a false conflict or whether there
is a real conflict in which two (or more) states’ laws are prima
facie applicable, and, if the latter, then (2) determining which
392
state’s law should apply. I have already explained why federal institutions are superior to state institutions for discharging
393
these two tasks. It also is true that Congress is institutionally
superior to federal courts to undertake them. As explained
above, real conflicts are intractable for courts because they require a court to render prognostications as to fact and values,
and ultimately to balance states’ incommensurable policy pref394
erences. Courts are not well-suited to making these types of
determinations, which helps explain why the Supreme Court’s
efforts to solve real conflicts through constitutional doctrine
395
have been unsuccessful. Congress, by contrast, is the appropriate institution as a matter of democratic theory to render
these deeply subjective decisions. It also has the most suitable
institutional characteristics to discharge the tasks involved in
resolving real conflicts. To profoundly compress an argument
396
I’ve made elsewhere at length, legislatures are designed to,
and well-practiced in, making tradeoffs among incommensurable commitments. Congress is composed of the states’ representatives, who are better situated than federal courts to identify their state’s interests. Congress’s prospective rule-making
encourages ex ante negotiations among state representatives,
and the legislative process allows simultaneous tradeoffs across
397
multiple issues that facilitate compromise solutions.
To say that Congress appropriately has final say over
choice-of-law is not to suggest that courts have no role to play.
To the contrary, choice-of-law in all likelihood is best generated
398
by an interplay between courts and Congress. Legislators do
391. For a discussion of comparative institutional analysis, see NEIL K.
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 3–5 (1994).
392. See Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi, supra, note 244, at 1869–72
393. See supra notes 174–86.
394. See supra Part II.B.2.d.
395. See infra note 469.
396. See Rosen, Congress’s Primary Role, supra note 170, at 17–25.
397. See id.
398. For an expanded version of this argument, as applied to the similar
(though not identical) context of constitutional decisionmaking, see Mark D.
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not have the time or competence to create choice-of-law rules
from scratch; intelligent choice-of-law rules probably cannot be
generated by legislators’ armchair hypotheticals or through deductive reasoning. By contrast, courts’ case-by-case, inductive
approach is well suited to identifying the competing considerations that give shape to different choice-of-law rules. But while
courts play a vital role in developing choice-of-law rules in a
common law, case-by-case fashion, there is an intractability to
choice-of-law that makes it unamenable to solutions about
399
which all reasonable minds can be expected to concur. For
this reason it is normatively appropriately that the judiciary’s
choice-of-law rules are provisional, in the sense that they can
be legislatively revised. The courts’ provisional solutions can
provide Congress a menu of well-considered options that clarify
the tradeoffs inherent in each choice-of-law alternative. As a
matter of both democratic theory and institutional design, Congress is the appropriate institution for negotiating over, and ultimately choosing among, the court-identified options.
Doctrinally, two paths allow the type of judicial-legislative
interplay that is best suited to generating intelligent choice-oflaw rules. Congress can enact open-ended choice-of-law statutes that vest courts with significant discretion in fleshing out
the choice-of-law rules. Or, absent congressional action, courts
can elaborate choice-of-law rules that have the status of federal
common law. Either way, Congress would have the ultimate
revisionary authority over the choice-of-law that courts have
created. Section D argues there already exist two statutes that
authorize federal and state courts to elaborate a single body of
federal choice-of-law that can satisfy the Single System Requirement. Section E explains that even without these statutes,
federal and state courts would have authority to generate a
federal common law of choice-of-law that satisfies the Single
System Requirement.

Rosen & Christopher W. Schmidt, Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles and
Popular Constitutionalism in the Health Care Case, 61 UCLA L. REV. 66, 132–
44 (2013). I hope to apply these ideas to the issue at hand of choice-of-law in a
subsequent article.
399. Cf. STORY, supra note 49, § 28 (endorsing the proposition that “in the
conflict of laws, it must often be a matter of doubt, which should prevail”).
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D. TWO STATUTORY BASES FOR JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF A
SINGLE COMPREHENSIVE BODY OF FEDERAL CHOICE-OF-LAW
Two federal statutes together authorize courts—both state
and federal—to develop a single body of federal choice-of-law
that would be applicable in both federal and state courts. A
post-Klaxon amendment to one of those statutes—the Full
Faith and Credit Act—constitutes statutory authorization for
state courts to develop federal choice-of-law rules on a case by
case basis, and arguably allows federal courts to do so as well.
Klaxon, however, stands as an obstacle to the second statute—
the Rules of Decision Act—which has clearer language than the
Full Faith and Credit Act authorizing federal courts to generate federal choice-of-law in diversity cases. This is yet another
reason why Klaxon should be formally overruled.
1. The Full Faith and Credit Act
The Full Faith and Credit Act (FF&C Act) was amended in
1948—after Klaxon was decided—to provide that the “[a]cts” of
the sister states “shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States . . . as they have by law or
usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from
400
which they are taken.” (Before 1948, the statute did not con401
tain the word “[a]cts.”). This statutory directive can be fulfilled only if there is a uniform choice-of-law in all state courts
that satisfies the Single System Requirement.
To understand why, consider once again the Harrah’s Club
case, where a Nevada tavern keeper overboozed a California
402
resident who subsequently had a car accident in California.
California’s choice-of-law principles, as we saw, selected California law. Nevada had different choice-of-law rules than California, and Nevada courts almost certainly would have selected
400. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948).
401. Id. The 1948 amendment has been called “perplexing” by scholars, see
Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 541, 548
& n.183 (1958), and has been almost entirely ignored by courts and
scholars,but see Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 422 (1955) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he new provision of [the full faith and credit statute] cannot be
disregarded. In 1948 Congress for the first time dealt with the full faith and
credit effect to be given statutes. . . . Hence, if [the amendment] has any effect,
it would seem to tend toward respecting Missouri’s legislation.”); Cheatham, A
Federal Nation, supra note 17, at 114 (“The 1948 amendment to the full faith
and credit statute has presented a new basis for the possibility that national
rules of conflict of laws have entirely supplanted the state rules.”).
402. See supra note 345.
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Nevada law. This circumstance violates the FF&C Act: the California act does not have the “same full faith and credit”—that
403
is to say, the same effect —in a Nevada court as it has in a
404
California court. The Nevada act likewise does not have the
405
same effect in California courts as it would have in Nevada.
And the FF&C Act’s statutory language of “acts” should be understood to extend to common law, just as (and for the same
reasons that) the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s language of
406
“acts” does. In short, the FF&C Act’s requirement that California’s act “have the same full faith and credit in every
court . . . as [it has] in the courts of” California only can be met
if both California and Nevada courts use the same choice-of-law
407
rules, satisfying the Single System Requirement.
Further, the Act’s requirements apply to “every court within the United States,” which includes federal courts, as Con408
gress can require under the Diversity Clause. Fulfilling the
Act’s requirements accordingly demands that federal courts use
the same choice-of-law rules as state courts. If they did not—if
federal courts used one set of choice-of-law rules and state
courts another—then the California act may not have the
“same full faith and credit in every court . . . as [it has] in the
409
courts of” California.
In short, analysis of the FF&C Act confirms that, as a matter of positive law, choice-of-law must satisfy the Single System
Requirement by being uniform over the jurisdictions whose
410
substantive law it manages.

403. 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Stephen Sachs persuasively argues that the original
1790 Act’s language of “full faith and credit” was meant to refer to
authentication rather than effect. See Sachs, supra note 15, at 1278. This does
not undermine the argument above in text. Regardless of how the Act
originally was understood, the United States Supreme Court interpreted full
faith and credit to mean effects in the 1813 case of Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. 481
(1813), which was thoroughly known and accepted by Congress and the state
courts by the early 1820s. See id. at 1274–76. Mills’s interpretation
unabatedly continued until Congress amended the Act in 1948, and continues
to this day.
404. See Laycock, supra note 15, at 296 (making same argument).
405. For the same reasons provided above, the statutory term “acts” should
include common law. See supra notes 385–87.
406. See supra notes 386–88.
407. 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
408. Id.; see supra note 390.
409. 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
410. See supra notes 327–36162.
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Since only federal law can provide such uniformity of
choice-of-law rules, it follows that the FF&C Act authorizes the
creation by judges in both state and federal courts of a single
body of federal choice-of-law rules that is applicable in both
federal and state courts. The resulting body of federal choice-oflaw rules can be described in one of two ways: either as the
product of statutory interpretation (of what it means for one
state’s act to “have the same full faith and credit in every
411
court”), or as federal common law necessary to effectuate the
412
statute. However described, the courts’ choice-of-law rules
always would be subject to congressional revision.
If this proposed interpretation of the FF&C Act is correct,
then Klaxon has been legislatively overruled by the 1948
amendments. Congress had the power to do so because Klaxon
413
was not a constitutional decision. On the other hand, courts
may be reluctant to find legislative revision because nothing in
the legislative history suggests Congress intended the 1948
414
Amendments to overrule Klaxon. Even without overruling
Klaxon, however, the FF&C Act still could be understood to authorize state and federal courts to create federal choice-of-law
rules on the basis of the statutory interpretation of the Act provided above. On this approach, the 1948 amendments would
have blunted Klaxon’s bite, requiring federal courts sitting in
411. 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
412. For present purposes, nothing turns on which locution is adopted. Cf.
Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Leyman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of
Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 332 (1980) (“The difference between ‘common
law’ and ‘statutory interpretation’ is a difference in emphasis rather than a
difference in kind. The more definite and explicit the prevailing legislative
policy, the more likely a court will describe its lawmaking as statutory
interpretation; the less precise and less explicit the perceived legislative
policy, the more likely a court will speak of common law. The distinction,
however, is entirely one of degree.”).
413. Klaxon nowhere suggested its holding was constitutional. Further, as
Professor Cavers explains, “the Constitution does not require the federal
judicial system to respect state lines. If the system were to cease to do so, the
command of Klaxon would no longer be reasonable.” CAVERS, supra note 363,
at 220 n.39; see also Hill, supra note 401, at 543–46 (concluding that federal
courts have constitutional power to make choice-of-law rules); Roosevelt, supra
note 19, at 17 n.90.
414. The 1948 Act was part of a massive overhaul of the judicial code, and
there is virtually no legislative history concerning the meaning of the
amendment’s addition of the word “acts” to § 1738. The Historical and
Revision Notes are not illuminating, explaining that the new language was
included to “follow[] the language of Article IV, section 1 of the Constitution.”
28 U.S.C. § 1738. I have reviewed the voluminous legislative history and found
nothing else.
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diversity to apply the (federal!) choice-of-law rules that the
state courts do. There is nothing awry with such a proposed interpretation of the amendments, as Congress unquestionably
has the power to make legislative alterations of the Court’s
415
non-constitutional decisions.
2. The Rules of Decision Act
The Rules of Decision Act (RDA), enacted in 1790, author416
izes federal courts to develop federal choice-of-law rules, but
has been paralyzed by Klaxon. The RDA provides that “[t]he
laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
417
apply.” The RDA addresses the two types of choice-of-law determinations that are necessary to fully prescribe what law
federal courts are to apply. The Act’s “except” clause addresses
‘vertical federalism’ choice-of-law: it instructs that the “law of
the several states” apply “except” if federal law otherwise ap418
plies. The Act’s final words address ‘horizontal federalism’
choice-of-law: in cases where federal law does not apply, federal
courts are to apply “the laws of the several states . . . in cases
419
where they apply.” The italicized language thus presupposes
the existence of a choice-of-law rule that determines which
420
state’s law properly “appli[es]” —something that Chief Justice
421
Marshall recognized back in 1825.

415. See generally Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317 (2014).
416. See Hart, supra note 327, at 17 (quoting the Rules of Decision Act’s
language of “in cases where they apply” and concluding that “[t]he federal
courts are in a peculiarly disinterested position to make a just determination
as to which state’s laws ought to apply where this is disputed”). Professor
Baxter came to a similar conclusion fifty years ago, see Baxter, supra note 17,
at 40–41. For a modern assertion of this view, see Kevin M. Clermont, The
Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 987, 998 & n.45
(2011).
417. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1948).
418. Id.
419. Id. (emphasis added).
420. Id.
421. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 48 (1825) (writing that the Rules
of Decision Act reflects the choice-of-law “principle that in every forum a
contract is governed by the law with a view to which it was made”), quoted in
Baxter, supra note 416, at 41 & n.144.
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The crucial question is this: what is the choice-of-law rule
that the RDA presupposes? The answer was straightforward at
the time of the Act’s enactment in 1790: the general law because, as shown in Part I, general law was the one and only
422
choice-of-law then recognized. The answer must change in a
423
post-Erie world in which there no longer is general law. Professor Cavers thought the RDA’s language of “in cases where
424
they apply” referred to the choice-of-law rules of the state in
which the federal court sat, thereby providing a statutory basis
425
for Klaxon. Professor Baxter disagreed, believing “in cases
where they apply” licensed the creation of a body of federal
choice-of-law rules by federal courts, and that “Klaxon should
426
be overturned.” Professor Hart likewise thought the RDA al427
lowed federal courts to develop a federal body of choice-of-law.
Professors Hart and Baxter must be correct because, as
this Article has exhaustively argued, choice-of-law is best understood as being federal law. Accordingly, “in cases where they
apply” authorizes federal courts to elaborate a body of federal
choice-of-law doctrine to govern horizontal choice-of-law questions that arise in their courts, which is always subject to con428
gressional revision. The RDA’s broad delegation to courts is
akin to the Sherman Act’s pithy formulation, which licensed
federal courts to develop an elaborate body of federal antitrust
429
law on a case-by-case basis. Klaxon, however, cripples this
part of the RDA for so long as it remains good law. This is yet
another reason why the case should be formally overturned.
Two related final thoughts. The FF&C Act itself provides
an additional counterargument to Professor Cavers’s interpretation of the RDA. After all, if the RDA authorizes Klaxon, as
Cavers thought, then the multiplicity of choice-of-law regimes
422. Cf. id. at 48 (referring to the choice-of-law principle incorporated in
the Rules of Decision Act as a “universal law”).
423. For a general discussion concerning what circumstances justify
changed interpretations of statutes, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
424. 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
425. CAVERS, supra note 363, at 220 & n.39.
426. Baxter, supra note 416, at 41 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1652) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
427. See Hart, supra note 327, at 515 (concluding that the Rules of
Decision Act allows federal court “development of a sound body of private
interstate law” of conflict of laws).
428. 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
429. See Mark D. Rosen, Nonformalistic Law in Time and Space, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 622, 624–27 (1999).
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it spawns undermines the FF&C Act. This undercuts Professor
Cavers’s interpretation under the principle that statutes should
430
be construed harmoniously. That same principle supports
this Article’s interpretation of the RDA, because it meshes perfectly with the FF&C Act’s requirement that sister states’ acts
“shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within
431
the United States” as they have in their states of origin.
E. CHOICE-OF-LAW AS FEDERAL COMMON LAW
If it should be determined that neither the FF&C Act nor
the RDA authorizes courts to develop federal choice-of-law
rules, there is one last doctrinal basis for holding choice-of-law
to be federal: overturning Klaxon and declaring choice-of-law to
432
be federal common law. Although I believe the FF&C Act
(and the RDA, were Klaxon overturned) already authorizes the
creation of federal choice-of-law rules for the reasons explained
above, the federal common law argument is very strong. Subsection One provides a five-step argument that leads to the
conclusion that, even absent any federal choice-of-law statutes,
once Klaxon were overruled, the choice-of-law rules created by
federal and state courts would have the status of federal common law. Subsection Two identifies the institutional implications of this conclusion.
1. That Choice-of-Law Would Be Federal Common Law
Were Klaxon to be overruled, and if there were no federal
choice-of-law statutes, the choice-of-law rules created by federal
and state courts would have the status of federal common law.
A five-step argument shows this to be correct.
First, as explained earlier, the Constitution grants Congress power to create choice-of-law rules for both federal and
433
state courts. Second, this constitutional grant to Congress
430. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 739 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (“[S]tatutes dealing with similar subjects should be interpreted
harmoniously.”).
431. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (emphasis added); see supra notes 400–08.
432. See supra notes 14–15 (identifying three other scholars who have so
argued). Elsewhere I have argued that, as a matter of positive law, the Court’s
Full Faith and Credit jurisprudence is best understood as federal common law,
not constitutional doctrine. See Rosen, Congress’s Primary Role, supra note
170, at 8–28. This reduces the extent to which overturning Klaxon would disrupt other doctrine, though reversing Klaxon unquestionably would have
downstream effects on other decisions.
433. See supra Part III.B.
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preempts the states from creating choice-of-law rules that have
434
the status of state law. This second step of the argument does
not automatically follow from the first because the federal and
state governments frequently have overlapping regulatory au435
thority. The second step, in other words, is that choice-of-law
is “exclusively federal . . . as to require uniform national dispo436
sition.” This Article’s arguments as to why choice-of-law is
federal—the need to satisfy the Single System Requirement,
and choice-of-law’s inherently federal functions of policing
states’ extraterritorial powers, determining the character of our
federal union, and maintaining the health of the interstate system— establish that choice-of-law must be exclusively federal.
Buttressing this conclusion, choice-of-law bears striking resemblance to other exclusively federal fields. Consider “interstate
and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of
437
States.” So, for example, as to disputes concerning interstate
water rights and borders, state law is preempted “not by Con438
gress but by the Constitution,” and federal common law resolves conflicting claims if no federal statutes provide the answer. Likewise, choice-of-law governs disputes among states
concerning their regulatory limits. Like interstate disputes
concerning water rights and borders, choice-of-law is “intrinsically federal” insofar as it governs regulatory disputes between
the states, and is best conceptualized as being federal common
439
law in the absence of congressional action.
Third, federal courts have power to create federal choice-oflaw rules on a case-by-case basis. The third step does not follow
ineluctably from the first and second, for there could be no operative law in the absence of congressional action. But such is
not the case with choice-of-law rules, because creating choiceof-law rules to determine which state’s law is operative is necessary for the disposition of interstate cases, and for that rea434. See Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided?
Some New Answers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 451, 492–98 (2007) (explaining
“constitutional preemption”).
435. For instance, the federal and state governments both have power over
immigration. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507–10 (2012).
436. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947); see
Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (quoting
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964) (discussing
how state law preempted where there are “uniquely federal interests”)).
437. Tex. Indus., 451 U.S. at 641.
438. See Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts:
Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1076 (1967).
439. Horowitz, supra note 14, at 1202 (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425).
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son is part of the judicial power to decide ‘cases’ and ‘controver440
sies’ that involve interstate facts.
Fourth, state courts also have the judicial power to create
federal choice-of-law rules. This is so because they too must
generate choice-of-law rules to decide the interstate cases before them. These choice-of-law rules are created on a case-bycase basis (i.e., are common law) and, for the reasons explained
in this Article, are federal. And choice-of-law is not unique in
this regard; state courts long have created federal common
441
law.
Fifth, and finally, because choice-of-law must be uniform to
satisfy the Single System Requirement and thereby serve its
managerial function, the federal common law of choice-of-law
cannot incorporate state law and vary across states, as federal
442
common law sometimes does. Instead, all federal and state
courts throughout the country, supervised ultimately by the
United States Supreme Court, must work to develop a single
body of federal choice-of-law.
2. Institutional Implications
If judge-created choice-of-law rules were federal common
law (as opposed to judicial doctrines implementing the FF&C
Act and the RDA), any judicial choice-of-law doctrines would
always be subject to congressional revision (just as would be
the case were the caselaw deemed to be interpretations of the
443
FF&C Act and the RDA). To put the matter more bluntly,
Congress would have the power to reject the federal common
law choice-of-law rules that courts—even the Supreme Court—
adopted.
Congress’s power to have the final say over choice-of-law
derives from the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s Effects Clause.
As explained immediately above, for so long as Congress does
not exercise its Effects Cause powers, courts hearing crossstate matters must decide those cases and, in so doing, develop
440. See Hill, The Erie Doctrine, supra note 401, at 544 (arguing that
federal courts’ power to create “choice of law rules of their own devising” comes
from Article III’s vesting in federal courts the “judicial power of the United
States”).
441. See Bellia, supra note 33 (noting that state courts have substantial
adjudicatory jurisdiction over federal law, and must clarify and fill gaps when
applying federal law, just as federal courts do).
442. See, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 504
(2001).
443. See Rosen, supra note 434, at 492–93.
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and utilize choice-of-law doctrines to determine which state’s
law applies. But the fact that courts were the first-movers
would not oust Congress of its Constitution-granted authority
over choice-of-law. Courts’ choice-of-law rules hence would be
akin to dormant commerce clause doctrine: dormant commerce
clause rules created by courts, regarding matters that Congress
could (but has not) regulated under the Commerce Clause, do
not displace Congress’s commerce clause authority. Just as
Congress may statutorily override judicial dormant commerce
444
clause doctrines, so too Congress would not be bound by, but
could reject, courts’ federal common law choice-of-law doctrines.
And it is sensible that Congress have ultimate decision-making
power over choice-of-law rules for the reasons explained
445
above.
IV. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS, AND CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM
FOR THE FUTURE
A. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
A ready template of objections to this Article’s argument
can be found in the strong defenses of Klaxon that were propounded by an all-star lineup of scholars from two generations
ago, including Professors David Cavers and Alfred Hill.
Klaxon’s defenders made an array of arguments to the effect that overruling Klaxon would diminish “uniformity and
446
certainty in the choice-of-law rules.” Overruling Klaxon would
lead to forum-shopping “since, as in pre-Erie days, counsel
could shop without sending cases off to other states, often with447
out having the case leave counsel’s home town.” They also argued that overruling Klaxon would create uncertainty in controversies involving two states with the same choice-of-law
rules since federal courts might choose altogether different
448
choice-of-law rules. But none of these objections applies to
this Article’s argument, because they all presume the existence
444. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (“It is well
established that Congress may authorize the States to engage in regulation
that the Commerce Clause would otherwise forbid.”); see also New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (standing for the same proposition, in
holding that Congress may grant states the right to regulate interstate
transportation of radioactive waste).
445. See supra notes 391–99.
446. Cavers, supra note 59, at 741.
447. CAVERS, supra note 363, at 222.
448. See Cavers, supra note 59, at 741.
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of one choice-of-law rule in state courts and different federal
rules in federal courts. Under the Single System Requirement
championed in this Article, by contrast, a single choice-of-law
regime would be applicable in all federal and state courts.
There accordingly would be no incentive for intrastate forum
shopping for superior choice-of-law rules, nor any incentive for
interstate forum shopping for choice-of-law.
Most of the arguments on Klaxon’s behalf are premised on
the notion that choice-of-law is fundamentally a matter of state
law. Thus, Professor Cavers’s primary claim, it is fair to say,
was that overruling Klaxon would invade “state autonomy in
449
Cavers rhetorically
determining the reach of state law.”
asked whether a “federal district judge [should] be empowered
to curtail that state’s authority whenever the accident of diversity litigation brings the state law within his jurisdictional
450
reach?” and concluded a state should “be master of its own
451
house.” Professor Hill and Professor Cheatham made similar
452
as does the most recent edition of Hart &
arguments,
Wechsler’s Federal Courts when it asks “[c]an a federal court in
State Y disregard the state’s choice of its own law without seri453
ously undermining a substantive state policy?”
The answer to all these objections is that while states have
the prerogative to decide whether their law extends to an interstate matter (within the limits on prescriptive jurisdiction set
by the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence), determining which
of several states’ prima facie applicable laws applies is not the
454
prerogative of any single state. As argued above, it instead is
455
a federal function. The understanding that choice-of-law rule
449. See CAVERS, supra note 363, at 217.
450. Id. at 217–18. Cavers’s question also assumes that different choice-oflaw rules would apply in state courts, contrary to this Article’s claim.
451. Id. at 218.
452. Cheatham, Federal Control, supra note 17, at 588 (expressing concern
about federalizing choice-of-law on account of “the destruction or diminution of
state power, with the consequent weakening of local self-government. In
conflict of laws it may be unwise, or at least premature, to sacrifice state
independence and diversity.”); Hill, supra note 440, at 556 (arguing against
federal choice-of-law rules on the ground that “the exercise of federal
jurisdiction should not be the occasion for what would, in practical effect, be a
substantial diminution of the power of a state, within its own borders, to
vindicate its policies as against the competing policies of other states,” though
noting that “[t]his is not an unshakable premise”).
453. FALLON, supra note 390, at 567.
454. For a similar argument, see Roosevelt, supra note 19, at 21.
455. See supra Part III.A.
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is federal law accordingly does not invade “state autonomy”
457
or “undermin[e] a substantive state policy.” Rather, choice-oflaw is appropriately part of the federal law that determines the
allowable scope of state autonomy and policies, helps establish
the nature of our federal union, and maintains the health of our
interstate federal system.
The misconception that choice-of-law is state rather than
federal law drives another argument propounded by Klaxon’s
defenders. Cavers argued “the federal courts do not constitute a
judicial system which is organized to execute the great responsibility with which it would be entrusted” were Klaxon over458
ruled. Cavers believed that “[s]uch a system requires a supreme court;” “for the resolution of nonconstitutional choice-oflaw cases the federal courts do not have a supreme court, and
459
clearly they should not have one.” What Cavers meant was
that the Supreme Court had not been formulating choice-of-law
460
rules, and that on account of “the great national importance
of most of the problems with which it chooses to deal, the Court
should not clog its docket with private litigation involving
461
Other matters, Cavers asserted,
choice-of-law questions.”
were “far too important to be set aside for the perplexing
462
choice-of-law problems that arise in private litigation.”
With all due respect, Professor Cavers’s argument here is
463
180 degrees off the mark. A full appreciation of the many federal interests explained in this Article that are implicated by
choice-of-law makes clear that the Supreme Court’s absence
from choice-of-law has been costly and wrongheaded. It has
kicked the can of choice-of-law to the states, which are not responsible for, are uninterested in, and incapable of responsibly
formulating rules that guard federal interests, and which are
456. CAVERS, supra note 363, at 217.
457. FALLON, supra note 390, at 567.
458. CAVERS, supra note 363, at 220–21.
459. Id. at 221.
460. Cavers, supra note 59, at 738 (noting that deciding cases that “can
give direction to, and impose uniformity upon, the courts subordinate to it . . .
is a function which clearly the Supreme Court of the United States has not
been discharging with respect to diversity cases involving choice-of-law
problems for many decades”).
461. CAVERS, supra note 363, at 221 n.40 (emphasis added).
462. Cavers, supra note 59, at 739.
463. Cavers’s descriptive claim likely builds on his assumption (discussed
above) that Klaxon’s overruling would lead to separate state and federal
choice-of-law regimes. After all, Supreme Court absenteeism is less likely
where the choice-of-law operative in all courts is federal law.
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incapable of achieving the uniformity demanded by the Single
System Requirement that is a sine qua non of an effective system of choice-of-law. The Supreme Court’s absenteeism is an
argument for overturning—not keeping—Klaxon.
Klaxon’s defenders raised two pragmatic arguments that
apply to this Article’s proposal. The first is that overruling
Klaxon would result in transition costs. The day after Klaxon
were overruled, or recognized as having been legislatively overruled, there would be uncertainty as to the applicable choice-of464
law rules. Further, as Cavers wrote, courts would be confronted with “the existence of a substantial body of federal
precedents (many of them over fifty years old)”—which by now
are more than 100 years old, virtually all of which preceded the
465
choice-of-law revolution. Would that old territorialist jurisprudence, which was subject to the legal realists’ scathing critiques, be binding precedent?
This is an important, but manageable, issue. There always
are transition costs when moving from one legal regime to another; such costs are not trumping reasons for maintaining the
status quo, but must be considered in relation to the costs of
not changing, which this Article has suggested are substantial.
Further, transition costs can be contained. For example, the
Supreme Court decision declaring Klaxon’s demise should explain that courts would not be limited by the old jurisprudence,
and furthermore should provide a framework to guide the development of federal choice-of-law doctrine. This Article is not
the place to do this in great detail, though the Article’s final
466
subpart provides some preliminary guideposts.
Perhaps the main anxiety animating Klaxon’s defenders
was concern that overruling the case would short-circuit the
choice-of-law revolution against territorialism that had just
467
then begun. While these concerns may have been valid when
they were made—in the early 1960s—it is difficult to credit
them today. The alternatives to territorialism have had the opportunity to refine themselves for more than half a century
464. Indeed, the transition costs would be greater under this Article’s
proposal than what Cavers et al. contemplated insofar as the uncertainty
would extend to the choice-of-law rules in state courts.
465. Cavers, supra note 59, at 738.
466. See infra Part IV.B.
467. See Cavers, supra note 59, at 738 (stating that “an about-face on
Klaxon would” lead federal courts to “turn[] their backs on the very process of
change from which improvement in choice-of-law decisions is expected to
come.”).
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across more than fifty jurisdictions. And while Cavers could
proclaim in 1959 that he “s[aw] no evidence that Klaxon has
468
given rise to a crisis,” it is hard to believe he would say the
same today, when sister states use nearly a half-dozen different
choice-of-law methodologies.
Another possible objection is that this Article ignores the
lessons of history, namely the Supreme Court’s failed efforts in
the 1930s, which it formally abandoned some decades later, to
use the Full Faith and Credit Clause to generate choice-of-law
469
rules. But this objection also fails. The Court’s aborted effort
aimed at constitutionalizing choice-of-law doctrine, an exclusively judicial task for all practical purposes. This was doomed
to failure, for the criteria the Court thought guided choice-oflaw—a “balancing” of the competing states’ interests—is beyond courts’ capacities; like comparative impairment, it required prognostication as to facts and a balancing of incom470
mensurables.
By contrast, this Article understands judicial solutions to
be statutory interpretation or provisional federal common law.
Judicial doctrines hence would be subject to congressional revision. Choice-of-law accordingly would be jointly developed by
courts and Congress. Institutional synergy is important because Congress has institutional characteristics crucial to developing intelligent choice-of-law rules, but is incapable of do471
ing so without judicial input.
B. CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM
Perhaps the strongest objection to this Article’s proposal is
skepticism that any acceptable choice-of-law regime can be ju468. Cavers, supra note 59, at 753.
469. See supra Part I.C. In a moment of extraordinary candor, the Supreme
Court explained “[w]e have, in the past, appraised and balanced state
interests when invoking the Full Faith and Credit Clause to resolve conflicts
between overlapping laws of coordinate States. This balancing approach
quickly proved unsatisfactory. As Justice Robert H. Jackson . . . aptly
observed, ‘it [is] difficult to point to any field in which the Court has more
completely demonstrated or more candidly confessed the lack of guiding
standards of a legal character than in trying to determine what choice of law is
required by the Constitution.’ In light of this experience, we abandoned the
balancing-of-interests approach under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 495–96 (2003) (citations
omitted).
470. See supra notes 314–22.
471. See Rosen, Congress’s Primary Role, supra note 170, at 17–28; supra
notes 391–399. Full explication of this must await another day.
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dicially created, based on the less than satisfactory outcome of
the twentieth century choice-of-law revolution in this country.
History may be said to provide additional support for such suspicion, insofar as nearly 800 years of international efforts to
472
generate choice-of-law rules has failed to yield a single widely
accepted solution. America’s experience, in conjunction with the
international efforts, may lead one to conclude that choice-oflaw grapples with intractable problems to which there are no
473
good answers.
I believe, however, that such cynicism about improving
choice-of-law is misplaced. To begin, only limited lessons can be
drawn from international choice-of-law because there are two
fundamental disconnects between domestic and international
choice-of-law. First, sister states stand in a different relationship to one another than do foreign countries. That factor alone
means that choice-of-law rules that are appropriate when deciding between French and German law may not properly govern domestic choice-of-law problems. Second, there is a far
greater chance of achieving a uniform choice-of-law system
within the United States than internationally—once it is recognized that choice-of-law is federal, and that it is under the ultimate checks of the Supreme Court and Congress.
Further, justifiable frustrations with the past sixty years’
choice-of-law revolution cannot legitimately cast doubt on the
possible success of this Article’s proposal, for two reasons. First,
choice-of-law’s status as state law over the past half century
has generated a multiplicity of choice-of-law regimes such that
the Single System Requirement has not been met. The multiplicity of choice-of-law regimes accordingly undermines the efficacy of each and every choice-of-law regime, making it impossible to definitively evaluate any one of them.
Second, choice-of-law has been profoundly misunderstood
since Klaxon, insofar as it has been viewed as a matter of “local
474
polic[y]” that aims at advancing a state’s “governmental interests,” when it in fact is fundamentally federal in character
472. See STORY, supra note 49, §§ 3–16 (providing historical overview of
choice-of-law).
473. Cf. id. § 28 (endorsing the observation that “‘[w]hen so many men of
great talents and learning are thus found to fail in fixing certain principles, we
are forced to conclude, that they have failed, not from want of ability, but
because the matter was not susceptible of being settled on certain principles
. . . . [I]n the conflict of laws, it must often be a matter of doubt, which should
prevail’” (quoting Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. (n.s.) 569, 595–96 (La. 1827)).
474. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
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and purpose. This misconception itself has distorted choice-oflaw’s development, with the result that disappointments with
the choice-of-law revolution cannot legitimately ground skepticism about this Article’s proposal of reconceptualizing choice-oflaw as non-constitutional federal law.
Indeed, the understanding that choice-of-law is federal law
that must satisfy the Single System Requirement provides the
proper—and, indeed, a very helpful—framework for the future
development of choice-of-law rules. For example, a state court
developing choice-of-law should not consider whether applying
its law would advance its state’s interest, but must ask whether all state and federal courts plausibly could be expected to
475
adopt its choice-of-law approach. This “generalizability requirement” would eliminate many choice-of-law rules presently
476
used. The generalizability requirement also identifies several
insights from the choice-of-law revolution that would be components of any federal choice-of-law: for example, false conflicts
and comparative impairment. Further, the understanding that
choice-of-law is federal permits identification of the overarching
purposes that properly guide choice-of-law’s development: supporting our federal system by facilitating the smooth operation
of the interstate system while ensuring that states remain
meaningfully empowered.
This Article is not the place to fully work out the detailed
doctrinal implications that follow from the understanding that
477
choice-of-law is federal. In the end, it likely is the case that
multiple choice-of-law solutions are conceptually and normatively sound, and that what matters is that one—and only
one—solution be operative at any point in time. And that, too,
is something only federal law can accomplish in our post-Erie
world.

475. Cf. Bellia, supra note 33, at 919 (making a similar argument about
reasoning courts should use when generating federal common law).
476. For example, the requirement would eliminate Leflar’s best law
approach, lex fori, and the rule used by Minnesota that was upheld by the
Supreme Court in the Hague decision. See Allstate Insur. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302 (1981) (upholding a Minnesota court’s application of Minnesota law
in a circumstance where, virtually all commentators agree, that state had only
three de minimis contacts with the parties and transaction, and another state
had far more intense interests in having its law applied); see CURRIE ET AL.,
supra note 125, at 348 (“[C]onflicts scholars have made a cottage industry of
criticizing the plurality opinion in Hague”).
477. I presently am at work on this project.

